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FOREWORD
This document presents the results of a study to assess the impact
of the Space Shuttle on historical spacecraft had it been operational in
the appropriate time frame, and to assess the impact it may have on the
design, development, and test phases of future space programs.
The study was performed in the 6-month period beginning 3
November 1971 by PRC Systems Sciences Company for the Space Shuttle
Program Office, Headquarters, National Aeron/utics and Space Admin-
istration under Contract NAS W-2282. Mr. William Fo Moore was the
contract technical monitor.
The PRC/SSC study team members were Eo E. Bean, Co E.
Bloomquist, W° C. Graham, R° Ho Kallmeyer, E. Kamiya, D. E.
LaGrange, H.G. Mallean, and C° M° Robb. Data reduction assistance
was provided by E° To Rumble and Eo M° Lucero. Production of the re-
port was ably directed by Do Ho O'Lear.
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An existing data base covering 304 spacecraft of the U.S. Space
program was analyzed to determine the effect on individual spacecraft
failures and other anomalies that the Space Shuttle might have had if it
had been operational throughout the period covered by the data. By
combining the results of this analysis, information on the prelaunch
activities of selected spacecraft programs, and Shuttle capabilities data,
the potential impact of the Space Shuttle on future space programs was
derived.
The Shuttle was found to be highly effective in the prevention or
correction of spacecraft anomalies, with 887 of 1,230 anomalies ana-
lyzed being favorably impacted by full utilization of Shuttle capabilities.
The Shuttle was also determined to have a far-reaching and favorable
influence on the design, development, and test phases of future space
programs. This is documented in 37 individual statements of impact.

PRC R- 1467
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................
I. INTRODUCTION ............................
II. STUDY INPUTS ...........................
A. The PRC/SSC Space Data Bank ...............
B. Shufile Capabilities ..................... 11
III. SHUTTLE IMPACT ON PREVIOUS SPACECRAFT
13PERFORMANCE ...........................
A. Anomaly Classification ................... 13
B. Spacecraft Availability Analysis ............. 19
IV. SHUTTLE IMPACT ON FUTURE SPACE PROGRAMS . . . 35
A. Spacecraft Design, Development,
and Test Experience ..................... 35
B. Statements of Impact ..................... 36
67
V. CONCLUSIONS ...........................
69
REFERENCES ................................
APPENDIX A: SHUTTLE CAPABILITIES .............. A-I
APPENDIX B: SPACECRAFT AVERAGE AVAILABILITY
B-IANA LYSIS .....................
iii
1
3
3

PRC R- 1467
ix
II
go
3.
4.
1
6.
7.
8.
9.
I0.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
LIST OF EXHIBITS
Annual Distribution of U.S. Spacecraft Launches
and Those in the PRG/SSG Space Data Bank
Through 1970 ............................
Tabulation of Spacecraft in PRG/SSG Space Data Bank ....
Anomalous Behavior Description Gard ..............
Frequency Distribution of Anomaly Occurrence
Versus Time ..............................
Shuttle Glassification Godes ......................
Anomaly Glassification Ground Rules ...............
Anomaly Distribution by Shuttle Impact ..............
Anomaly Distribution by Shuttle Impact and Mission Effect .
Anomaly History for Spacecraft 15b ...............
Instantaneous Availability for Spacecraft 15b Without
Shuttle Utilization ...........................
Instantaneous Availability for Spacecraft 15b Under
Various Shuttle Utilizations .....................
Selected Sample of Space Programs ................
Summary of Spacecraft Average Availability Analysis ....
Average Spacecraft Availability Versus Launches
per Spacecraft ............................
Instantaneous Availability Profiles for an Average
Spacecraft ................................
Spacecraft Design, Development, Test, and Operation
with Space Shuttle ...........................
Anomaly Distribution Among Major Components and
Equipment Type s ...........................
5
6
9
IZ
14
15
16
20
21
23
27
29
3Z
33
34
37
39

PRC R- 1467
1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Space Shuttle will impact future unmanned space programs
in two ways. First, its implementation will prevent the loss of payloads
at launch, will reduce the frequency of launch induced anomalies, and
will provide a means of correcting postlaunch anomalies of individual
spacecraft. Second, it will exert an influence on the prelaunch design,
development, and test activities or payloads.
The extent of this impact is investigated in the study reported
herein by conjecturally superimposing Shuttle capabilities on an exist-
ing historical file of operational spacecraft reliability data. The his-
torical file is the PRC/SSC Space Data Bank. It contains data on the
actual performance of 304 spacecraft of the U.S. space program
launched in the 1958 to 1970 time span. A record of prelaunch acti-
vities is also available in the Data Bank for many of these spacecraft.
Two broad objectives are defined for the study. The first is to
show which of the 1,230 spacecraft anomalies recorded in the Data Bank
could have been prevented or corrected had the Space Shuttle been avail-
able for use during the indicated time span, and to investigate the im-
pact the Space Shuttle would have had on the associated spacecraft. The
second objective is to identify specific changes which may be expected
in future payload design, development, and test activities by hypothesiz-
ing full utilization of the Space Shuttle capabilities on programs docu-
mented in the PRC/SSC Space Data Bank.
A discussion of the two basic data sources for this study is pre-
sented in Section II of this report. The first is the data on the reliabil-
ity aspects of operational spacecraft in the U.S. space program that is
referred to herein as the PRC/SSC Space Data Bank or simply the Data
Bank. A general description of the total Data Bank with emphasis on
those portions particularly applicable to this study is given in sub-
sectionII. A. The second basic data source consists of reports and
other documentation describing Space Shuttle capabilities and is dis-
cussed in subsection II. B. Appendix A contains an internally generated
document that summarizes Shuttle capabilities as used for this study.
PRC R- 1467
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Section III addresses itself to the analyses of the Data Bank per-
formed during this study. Each spacecraft anomaly was evaluated anew
and coded in accordance with the potential impact the Space Shuttle
would have had were it available. For this purpose 15 Space Shuttle
impact codes were identified. Also, the spacecraft from a selected set
of space programs were analyzed in detail to determine (1) individual
and average spacecraft availability without the Shuttle and (2) the corre-
sponding availabilities under the assumption of various Shuttle utiliza-
tion profiles. Appendix B is a detailed summary of this analysis.
The potential impact of the Space Shuttle on the design, develop-
rnent, and test phases of a typical, future, unmanned spacecraft is
treated in Section IV. A generalized flow diagram indicating spacecraft
design, development, test, and operational activities, utilizing the
Space Shuttle, was developed based on information from past spacecraft
programs as contained in the Data Bank and future Space Shuttle capa-
bilities as summarized in Appendix A. Thirty-seven statements of
impact were then generated to indicate the specific influence of the
Space Shuttle on these activities as applied to potential future programs.
A rationale and supporting data from the Data Bank are included for
each statement of impact.
Section V contains the conclusions of the study. The study clearly
indicates %hat the Space Shut£1e can have a very favorable effect both on
the postlaunch availability of spacecraft through the prevention or alle-
viation of anomalistic behavior and on the prelaunch design, develop-
ment, and test activities mainly through the increased range of choice
opened to the designer by Shuttle System capabilities.
II. DATA SOURCES
PRC R- 1467
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This study, like most, relies heavily on previously accomplished
work. Inputs to this study are of two kinds. One is the documentation
of historical behavior and related information regarding spacecraft in
the U.S. space program referred to collectively as the PRC/SSC Space
Data Bank. The other includes various study reports and interiminfor-
mation that defines Space Shuttle capabilities. These two sources of
data are discussed in the following subsections.
A. The PRC/SSC Space Data Bank
I. Introduction
Detailed information regarding the scope, generation and contents
of the PRC/SSC Space Data Bank is available in a document I titled:
"Reliability Data From In-Flight Spacecraft; 1958-1970." This document
complements the results of a previous study to compile, interpret, and
analyze reliability data on U.S. spacecraft. The earlier study, docu-
mented in Reference 2, was completed in March 1967. These two re-
ports are the primary published documentation formulated from the
Data Bank and contain much, but by no means all, of the collected data.
The Data Bank draws on two sources of information. The first
is the open literature. Through the years a large number of reports
and papers have been published documenting many aspects of a large
number of space programs. The various space programs and their
sponsoring agencies are (for the most part) identified in the open
literature.
Sponsoring agencies of specific space programs responding to
requests for specific data elements represent the second but most im-
portant source of information in the Data Bank. For each program in-
cluded in the Data Bank, a request was made to the sponsoring agency
for two major types of data: (1) an engineering report of the final design
of the spacecraft, and (2) a flight analysis for individual spacecraft from
which operating histories and a11 known anomalous behavior could be
I
Reference I.
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obtained. Other types of information utilized in the Data Bank include
reliability assessment reports, documents describing design, develop-
ment, test, and prelaunch activities, and interviews with program man-
agement personnel. The scope of these studies precluded the analysis
of raw telemetry reports or daily logs of the operational experience of
spacecraft. Sources other than the cognizant program offices were not
used, except to fill in gaps in the basic documentation. In the Data Bank
all data elements are, of course, related to specific spacecraft or space
programs. However, at the request of many program offices, published
reports derived from the Data Bank may not relate specific anomalies or
anomaly records to specific spacecraft. That procedure is followed in
this report by identifying spacecraft, where necessary, by code number
only.
Z. Scope
The scope of the Data Bank is indicated in Exhibit 1. Over-
all, the Data Bank provides operational reliability data on approximately
40 percent of all U.S. spacecraft launches and attempted launches
through 1970. As indicated earlier the Data Bank was accumulated in
two stages. The first stage provided data through 1965, the second
stage provided the data thereafter. In the second stage, access to mili-
tary program data was considerably reduced and no data were actively
sought for spacecraft with nominally short mission durations. The data
quality in the second stage was greatly improved over that in the first
stage for both NASA and the unrestricted military programs.
Exhibit 2 lists the programs included in the Data Bank together
with the number of spacecraft sampled from each program. The spon-
soring agency and the years in which launches occurred for each pro-
gram are also included in this exhibit. Although the quantity and quality
of the data received from each program varies widely, the Data Bank
contains all readily available summary information.
3. Data Elements
For each spacecraft in the Data Bank, three categories of
data are accumulated in standardized working papers referred to as
PRC R-1467
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EXHIBIT 2 - TABULATION OF SPACECRAFT IN PRC/SSC SPACE
DATA BANK
Launch Number of
Program AKenc_" Dates Spacecraft in Sample
Agena Air Force 1959-1965 93
ANNA Navy 1962 Z
Ariel NASA/UK 196Z- 1964 2
ATS NASA 1966-1969 5
Courier Army Signal Supply Agency 1960 2
Early Bird COMSAT 1965 I
Echo NASA 1964 l
Explorer 3Z NASA 1966 1
Gemini NASA 1964- 1966 8
GEOS NASA 1965-1968 Z
IMP NASA 1963- 1967 6
Injun NASA 1963-1964 3
Lofti Navy 1961- 1963 Z
Mariner NASA 1962-1967 7
Me rcury-Atlas NASA 1959-1963 25
Nimbus NASA 1964-1970 5
OAO NASA 1966-1970 3
OGO NASA 1964- 1969 6
Orbiting Vehicle
OVI Air Force 1965-1969 12.
OVZ Air Force 1965 Z
OV3 Air Force 1966-1967 6
OV4 Air Force 1966 2
OV5 Air Force 1967-1969 3
Oscar Amateur Radio 1961-1966 4
OSO . NASA 196Z-1969 8
Pioneer NASA 1965-I 969 5
RAE NASA 1968 l
Ranger NASA 1961-1965 9
Relay NASA 1962 I
Secor Army 1964-1970 14
Snapshot AEC/Air Force 1965 1
Sol rad Navy 1960- 1968 3
Syncom NASA 1963-I 964 3
Telstar Bell Telephone Lab 196Z-1963 Z
TIROS NASA 1960-'I 963 8
T OS ESSA/NOAA 1966-1969 7
T raac Navy 1961 1
Transit Navy 1959-1966 17
Vanguard NASA 1957-1959 11
Vela Air Force 1963-1969 I0
TOTALS 40 P rog rams
304 Spacecraft
Launch Dates: 1957-1970
1230 Anomalies
PRC R- 1467
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Engineering Analysis Reports (EARs). The three categories of informa-
tion are (I) general data elements, (2) reliability data elements, and (3) de-
velopment and prelaunch data elements. The general data elements include:
• Spacecraft launch date
• Launch vehicle
• Launch site
• Intended mission
• Initial orbital parameters
• General spacecraft description
• Performance record
• Number of hours on orbit covered by the Data Bank
The Data Bank was originally generated with the specific objective
of collecting the reliability data elements. This initial objective was
further constrained to collect those reliability data elements which
would permit the calculation of on-orbit failure rates for piece parts.
To achieve this objective each spacecraft was first defined in terms of
its subsystems and major components. Typical major components are
command receivers, telemetry transmitters, tape recorders, power
converters, and horizon sensors. A space-environment operating pro-
file of each component was then deduced from spacecraft operational
records including the proportion of time in a standby condition, number of
times cycled, and the occurrence time of component-related failures or
other anomalies. A breakdown of the number of piece parts in each major
component was determined. It was assumed that if the component was oper-
able all of its constituent piece parts were also. If the component failed
(ceased operating) all its piece parts were removed from the sample.
The final tabulation for the reliability data element is the description
of each anomaly (failure or any other nonnominal mission behavior)
recorded during the time the spacecraft was under observation.
The spacecraft anomaly data and the development and prelaunch
data elements are the portions of the Data Bank most immediately rele-
vant to the study reported herein. Due to the objectives of the original
data collection, little emphasis was placed on securing data elements
on the prelaunch portions of a spacecraft' s life cycle. The update of
the Data Bank, reported in Reference 1, did not seek these elements
PRC R- 1467
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and only incorporated them in the Data Bank if they were received
together with information on the general or reliability data elements.
Cooperation of the various space program offices, together with a
number of independent reliability assessment contracts performed by
PRC for programs in the Data Bank, results in a significant amount of
prelaunch data even though it is much less systematic than the other
data elements.
4. Spacecraft Anomalies
Since the anomalous behavior descriptions play such an important
role in this study, a discussion of their content and derivation is in order.
First, it must be emphasized that these anomalous incidents are those
reported, either in the open literature or by the cognizant program office.
Thus, there are certainly fewer anomalies recorded in the Data Bank
than have actually occurred on the spacecraft. The reported anomalies
are assumed, however, to be reasonably representative of all anomalies
and especially the more significant ones.
There are l,g30 anomalies in the Data Bank. Summaries, reduced
from detailed descriptions in the EARs, of 692 of these are contained in
Reference 2; summary descriptions of 538 more recent anomalies are
in Reference I. The tabulations in these two references are taken di-
rectly from cards, one of which is prepared for each observed anomaly.
Exhibit 3 is a reproduction of one of these cards. The upper por-
tion of the card contains coded information used in the analyses of Refer-
ences I and 2. The lower portion contains, from left to right, (I) an
index number identifying the anomaly for a particular spacecraft, (Z) the
time of occurrence of the anomaly, and (3) an abbreviated description of
the anomaly. The anomaly shown in Exhibit 3 was the first recorded
against the particular spacecraft and occurred at some indeterminate
time less than one day, denoted by epsilon. The normal entry in this posi-
tion is the number of hours from launch to anomaly occurrence.
The number in the upper left hand corner of the card indicates the
spacecraft prograrru The letter indicates the particular spacecraft in
that program, in launch sequence. The number in the upper right hand
PRC R- 1467
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corner is a card index number. The remaining codes are defined in
detail in either Reference l or 2. Briefly, reading from left to right,
they serve to define for sorting purposes: (1) whether the spacecraft is
intended for a long or short duration mission, (2) whether the anomaly
occurred in the launch or orbital phase of the mission, (3) the effect of
the anomaly on mission objectives, (4) the subsystem in which the ano-
maly occurred, (5) whether it is primarily electrical or mechanical,
(6) whether it represents a piece part failure, and (7) whether or not it
has an assignable cause. The last code of the sequence associates the
anomaly with a particular function of the subsystem in which it occurred.
The code describing the effect of the anomaly on mission objectives
(third in the sequence) is used extensively in this study. The possible
codes are the numbers l through 5, and the letter U. The letter U indi-
1
cates an unreported effect on the mission. The numbers index a per-
centage degradation in the capability of the spacecraft to perform its
intended mission. The code is intended to be independent of time and
other anomalies. That is, the code indicates the effect of the anomaly on
a perfect spacecraft at time zero. The influence of redundancy or other
backup is noted on the card in the narrative section. These codes are
defined as follows:
Mission Effect Code
1
2
3
4
5
When assigning the code,
Percent Degradation
0to5
5 to 33
33 to 67
67 to 95
95 to 100
reliance is placed on the evaluation of the el-
fect by the program office tempered with independent determinations
of number of experiments lost, decline in data quality or coverage, etc.
All 1,230 anomalies have been transferred to computer tape for
ease in manipulation. A typical printout of the data lists all anomalies
IThere were only two of these in the entire Data Bank.
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by time of occurrence, a parameter of considerable interest to this
study. Exhibit 4 graphically depicts the distribution of anomalies by
occurrence time and shows that nearly half of all anomalies occur in the
first week after launch. Further analysis of anomaly occurrence time
and other aspects of the Data Bank is deferred to Section III.
B. Shuttle Capabilities
To determine the hypothetical impact of the Space Shuttle on the
spacecraft on-orbit anomalies and on the design, development, and test
activities of programs in the PRC/SSC Space Data Bank, it was neces-
sary to outline in some detail the capabilities of the Shuttle System.
This was done using as a starting point the Level I Space Shuttle Pro-
gram Requirements Document controlled by the Space Shuttle Program
at NASA Headquarters. The results, which remained fixed for the dura-
tion of this study, are presented in Appendix A. None of the recently
reported changes to the Shuttle System are judged to have a significant
impact on the conclusions of this study.
The general baseline Shuttle and Space Tug configurations used in
this study were those defined in the Aerospace Corporation Integrated
Operations/Payload/Fleet Analysis, Final Report, August 1971, Report
Number ATR-72(7231)-l. The new concepts for spacecraft design,
development, and test operations were evolved from preliminary work
documented in the Lockheed Missiles and Space Corporation Final Report,
Payload Effects Analysis Study, 30 June 1971, Report Number LMSC-
A990556.
In Appendix A, as in the body of this report, the terms Space
Shuttle, Shuttle System, Shuttle and Tug, Space Transportation System
(STS), and Shuttle are all generally interchangeable, depending on the
particular context for their exact meaning.
PRC R- 1467
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III. SHUTTLE IMPACT ON PREVIOUS SPACECRAFT PERFORMANCE
The investigations reported in this section of the report are concerned
with determining the influence the Shuttle might have had on the spacecraft
anomalies recorded in the Data Bank. Each anomaly is analyzed to
determine if the Shuttle could be expected to have had any influence and,
if so, what the general nature of that influence might have been. The
Shuttle impact on individual spacecraft is also examined. These inves-
tigations are reported in the following two subsections. In both sub-
sections it is assumed that the historical spacecraft are as specified in
the Data Bank record except that they are Shuttle-compatible as de-
scribed in Appendix A and that they are launched in an era of full
Shuttle capability.
A. Anomaly Classification
As indicated in the previous section, there are 1230 spacecraft
anomalies in the Data Bank. Classifying the anomalies for this study
involves assigning to each anomaly a code which describes the impact
that the Space Shuttle could have exerted on it. Fifteen codes were
developed; they are listed and briefly defined in Exhibit 5. Exhibit 6
lists the more general ground rules used in classifying the anomalies
and where others are needed, they are given in context.
Exhibit 7 illustrates the classification process and summarizes
the results.
Of the 1230 anomalies, 19 were not applicable to nor consistent
with shuttle missions; for instance, the anomalies associated with re-
entry, impact, and recovery of manned spacecraft obviously do not apply.
These 19 anomalies were assigned Code A. Of the 1211 applicable ano-
malies, the descriptive data for Ii of them were insufficient to make any
further judgment regarding Shuttle impact; these were assigned Code B.
Of the remaining 1200 anomalies with sufficient descriptive data, 84
were judged to be preventable with Shuttle utilization. These anomalies
are preventable because: l) a unit-reliable shuttle would have prevented
the 40 unsuccessful launches (Code C); Z) the launch environment of the
Shuttle would have prevented the 29 anomalies induced by the more
severe launch effects of conventional booster systems (Code D); and 3) the
PRC R- 1467
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EXHI BIT 5 - SHUTTLE CLASSIFICATION CODES
A. NOT APPLICABLE
o Inconsistent with assumption of STS existence
B. UNKNOWN. INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION TO CATEGORIZE
C. UNSUCCESSFUL LAUNCHES
D. LAUNCH INDUCED
o Anomaly induced by standard launch operations but not
anticipated by shuttle launch operation
E. DESIGN INDUCED
o Design shortcomings of a major component detectable
during a shuttle test flight
F. STATUS QUO. RESOLVED
o Anomaly was corrected or overridden by ground controls
(not by switching to a redundant unit or capability)
0 Was compensated for by changing operational procedures,
programs, etc.
o Self-healed in short time (< shuttle launch reaction time
1 week)
G. MINOR, NO MISSION EFFECTS
o Anomaly so lacking in adverse mission effect that repair
would never be undertaken
o Occurred only rarely causing little or no lasting effects
H. MINOR, CONDITIONALLY REPAIRABLE
o Anomaly which would be repaired only if the shuttle were
at the spacecraft for another reason
I. MINOR, CONDITIONALLY NONREPAIRABLE
o Anomaly which could not be repaired even if the shuttle
were at the spacecraft
J. MINOR, INSUFFICIENT DATA
o Anomaly of known negligible effect which cannot be placed
in Categories G. It, or I for lack of data in the space
data bank
K. REPAIRABLE, SHUTTLE ONLY
o Ozbit ephemerides correction or reestablishment for low
orbits
o Spacecraft stabilization or orientation for low orbits
o Module replacement, system adjustment, or calibration
for low orbits
L. REPAIRABLE, SHUTTLE AND TUG
o Module replacement, system adjustment, or calibration
for high earth orbits
M. REPAIRABLE, TUG ONLY
o Orbit ephemerides correction or reestablishment at high
orbits
o Spacecraft stabilization or orientation, at high orbits
N. GROUND REPAIRABLE ONLY
o Design shortcoming not detectable during test flights and
not repairable by shuttle
0 Detailed diagnosis not compatible with shuttle capabilities
O. NON_PREVENTABLE/NON-REPAIRABLE
o Non-recoverable spacecraft (e. g.. heliocentric orbits,
lunar irnpact trajectories)
PRC R- 1467
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EXHIBIT 6 - ANOMALY CLASSIFICATION GROUND RULES
o
O
o
o
o
o
o
The STS is assumed to be unit reliable.
An STS is assumed to be available for tests, launch,
or maintenance, as required.
Anomalies whose mission effect code is Z or greater
will be repaired whenever the Shuttle classification
code indicates that repair is possible.
The STS will repair anomalies with mission effect
Code 1 only if the Shuttle is at the spacecraft for
another reason--launch or repair of a more severe
anomaly.
For Shuttle repair missions, the average time from
anomaly occurrence to restoration is assumed to be
one week (170 hours). This does not include mission
effect Code 1 anomalies nor those occurring within
an already-scheduled Shuttle mission as for launch
or repair of another anomaly.
Ground repair of anomalies is assumed to require
three weeks (500 hours) from anomaly occurrence
to restoration of the spacecraft on orbit.
On-orbit repair time is assumed to be negligible with
respect to arrival time (the time from anomaly oc-
currence to Shuttle/spacecraft contact) for all repair-
able spacecraft and anomalies.
Spacecraft component design faults detectable in five
days of space operation but not detectable in ground
tests are assumed to be preventable via a Shuttle
test prior to the spacecraft mission.
On a spacecraft launch mission, a Shuttle is assumed
to remain in position for repairs for Z4 hours after
spacecraft deployment and establishment of steady-
state ope ration.
PRC R- 1467
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use of the Shuttle for on-orbit testing would have prevented the 15 design-
related anomalies that could have been detected only by on-orbit testing
(Code E). A typical Code D anomaly is a pressure vessel leak due to
excessive launch vibrations. Horizon sensor inaccuracies due to sensitivity
to cold clouds and other gradients account for seven of the 15 Code E
anomalies.
Of the remaining l 116 anomalies that were classified "Not Preventable,"
156 were actually resolved during the spacecraft mission (Code F). That
is, positive action from the ground was able to negate the effects of the
anomaly, or the anomaly self-healed within a week with no lasting effects.
Anomalies resolved by switching to a redundant unit or capability are not
included in this category. An example of a Code F anomaly is the discovery
that the slits of an aspect sensor are electrically reversed. This problem
was resolved by software changes to correct the ground displays. The 960
anomalies that were not resolved were further categorized as those having
minor mission effects and those with major effects. The minor and major
effects are defined by the mission effect codes given in Section II, page 10.
The minor effect anomalies are defined as those with mission ef-
fect Code 1. Major effect anomalies are those with mission effect Codes
2 through 5. There is one exception to this definition. Any anomaly which
was assigned Code 1 because a redundant capability was available is
included in the major effect group rather than the minor effect group.
As can be seen in Exhibit 7 there are 485 minor effect anomalies and
475 major effect anomalies.
The 485 minor effect anomalies are further divided into: 1) 40
anomalies so lacking in adverse effect that repair would never be undertaken
(Code G), Z) 367 minor effect anomalies which could be repaired but whose
repair would be undertaken only if the Shuttle were at or near the space-
craft for some other purpose (Code H), 3) 31 minor effect anomalies that
could not be repaired even if a Shuttle were at the spacecraft (Code I), and
4) 47 minor effect anomalies where the data is inadequate to classify them
in either of the preceding three codes (Code J). A typical Code G anomaly
is the one reporting the condition that power delivered by a battery was
two percent below the predicted minimum due mainly to estimating errors
and changing mission requirements; no adverse mission effects were
PRC R- 1467
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attributed to this condition. Intermittent telemetry monitors are common
Code H anomalies. Excessive temperature in an experiment boom pack-
age caused by reflection from the solar arrays is a typical Code I anomaly;
that is, it cannot be repaired on orbit but its mission effect is not severe
enough to return the entire spacecraft to ground to rectify it.
The repairability of the 475 major effect anomalies was assessed.
Thirty-nine were judged not repairable {Code O) and 436 were judged
repairabIe. Code O anomalies are largely those from spacecraft in inter-
planetary orbits; catastrophic explosion of a system on an earth-orbital
satellite is an anomaly also included in this category. For the purpose of
evaluating the Shuttle utilization mode, the repairable anomalies were
further categorized into: l) 186 anomalies that could be repaired with a
Shuttle only (Code K), 2) 218 anomalies that would also require a Tug to
transport the spacecraft to the Shuttle for repairs (Code L), 3) 2 anoma-
lies where the Tug would be able to effect repair without transporting the
spacecraft to the Shuttle (Code M), and 4) 30 anomalies that could not be
repaired on orbit and whose effect is sufficiently degrading to return the
spacecraft to the ground for repairs (Code N). Code K anomalies are
characteristic of spacecraft in low earth orbits; typical are tape recorder
failures where it is assumed that the failed recorder is simply replaced
with a like item. Code L anomalies are similar, but occur on spacecraft
in synchronous or other high-energy earth orbits. The two Code M ano-
malies both involve non-nominal orbital parameters of high-energy earth
orbital spacecraft. The parameters are assumed to be correctable with
the Tug only; i.e., there is no necessity to return these spacecraft to the
ShuttIe. Excessive operating temperature due to inadequate spacecraft
thermal design is an example of an anomaly which is assumed to be cor-
rectable only by returning the spacecraft to ground; i.e., a Code N ano-
maly. Many of the more serious radio frequency interference (RFI),
microphonics, and parameter drift problems also fall in this category.
Thus, the categories that can be favorably impacted by Shuttle
utilization are Codes C, D, and E,--the preventable anomalies-- and
Codes H, K, L, M, and N--the repairable anomalies. There are 887 ano-
malies classified in these categories, representing about 72 percent of all
anomalies reported in the Data Bank.
PRC R- 1467
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Exhibit 8 arrays all anomalies by the mission effect categories
defined earlier and the Shuttle classification codes. Note that well over
half the anomalies are mission effect Code I and therefore do not consti-
tute a serious loss in mission capability. The anomalies bearing mission
effect Code Z (Z8 percent of the total) constitute at least a serious annoy-
ance but cause considerably less than 50 percent mission degradation.
That is, if 50 percent or more degradation in mission effectiveness were
defined as a spacecraft failure, at least 85 percent of all anomalies defi-
nitely would not, by themselves, result in spacecraft failure. Thus, all
mission effect Codes 3, 4, 5, and unknown anomalies and unsuccessful
launches account for less than 15 percent of the anomalies in the Data
Bank. Fifty-five of the Code 1 anomalies (4. 5 percent) would have had a
more severe mission effect except for the provision of redundancy.
Of the 57 essentially catastrophic anomalies (mission effect codes
4 and 5) nearly 80 percent (45 anomalies) could have been favorably
affected by Shuttle utilization. Twelve (ZI percent) could have been pre-
vented and 33 (58 percent) could have been repaired. If unsuccessful
launches are included as catastrophic spacecraft failures, then 88 per-
cent of all spacecraft catastrophes could have been prevented or other-
wise remedied by Shuttle utilization.
B. Spacecraft Availability Analysis
The preceding analysis is quite indicative of the potential useful-
ness of the Space Shuttle in the prevention and correction of spacecraft
anomalies. In this subsection, the analysis is extended to assess the
potential impact on individual spacecraft, taking into account both the
occurrence times and cumulative effects of the various anomalies associ-
ated with a particular spacecraft.
1. Procedure
To illustrate the analysis procedure, consider the anomaly
history of Spacecraft 15b in the Data Bank as shown in Exhibit 9. This
spacecraft immediately after insertion into orbit suffered a highly detri-
mental design related anomaly (mission effect Code 4) which could have
been prevented by prelaunch orbital testing on the Shuttle (Shuttle impact
Code E). Another less severe anomaly (mission effect Code Z) occurred
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EXHIBIT 8 - ANOMALY DISTRIBUTION BY SHUTTLE IMPACT AND
MISSION EFFECT
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EXHIBIT 9 - ANOMALY HISTORY FOR SPACECRAFT 15b
Anomaly Occur rence Mi s sion Effect Shuttle Impact
Sequence Time (Hours) Code Code
1 e 4 E
2 • 2 E
3 660 2 L
4 1,136 1 H
5 1,210 1 H
6 1,775 1 H
7 1,775 1 J
8 1,786 2 L
9 1,790 3 L
10 1,800 l H
11 1,800 1 E
12 2,200 1 H
13 2,524 2 1
14 2,754 l H
15 2,880 1 5
16 2,880 I G
17 3,391 1 F
18 3,393 l F
19 3,631 l H
20 3,650 1 F
21 3,790 1 H
22 4,518 1 H
23 5,860 3 L
24 8,330 2 L
25 9,500 2 L
26 9,800 2 L
27 10,600 2 L
28 13,140 2 L
29 13,150 1 H
30 ~ 1 J
End of Data 1 4,144
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shortly thereafter, also design related and preventable using the Shuttle
for orbital test. The third anomaly, at 660 hours, had a mission effect
Code Z and a Shuttle impact Code L, indicating a repairable anomaly requir-
ing both the Shuttle and the Tug. The twenty-ninth anomaly is the last one
for which a specific time of occurrence is available. The Exhibit 9 entry
indicates that this anomaly occurred at 13,150 hours, had only a slight
mission effect (Code 1), and would have been repairable if the Shuttle were
at or near the spacecraft (Code H). Anomaly 30 was a report of spurious
and ineffective commands occurring sporadically throughout the mission.
Hence, no specific time of occurrence is given. The effect of the anomaly
is slight in any event (Code 1) and there is not enough information reported
about it to determine whether the anomaly would have been Shuttle-repair-
able or not (Code J). Operating data were accumulated on this spacecraft
for 14, 144 hours.
A profile of the instantaneous spacecraft availability versus time is
shown in Exhibit 10. The instantaneous availability of the spacecraft is
defined as that fraction of maximum spacecraft capability remaining at
any given time. Each spacecraft is assumed to be launched with a perfect
instantaneous availability (1.0) although, as in the case here, degradation
from this value at time e is graphically and practically indistinguishable
from degradation at time 0. Degradation is assumed to cumulate in a
multiplicative fashion. That is, defining instantaneous availability
immediately after the nth anomaly as A n and the degradation occurring due
to the ith anomaly as D i,
n
A n = rl (l-Di)i= 1
Degradation in spacecraft capability upon the occurrence of an anomaly
is related to Exhibit 9 through the mission effect code using a specific
and singular percentage degradation for each mission effect code as
listed in the following tabulation.
Mission Effect Degradation
Code (Percent)
1 2.5
Z 20
3 50
4 80
5 97.5
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These values fall approximately at the midpoint of the ranges defined
earlier and are used simply to make the analysis more tractable.
Thus, after the first anomaly the spacecraft is degraded to Z0
percent of its nominal capability. After the second, which occurred at
essentially the same time, instantaneous or point availability is further
reduced to 16 percent. Z
A 2 :Fi (1-Di)i=!
={1-0.80){1-0. Z0)
=0o 16
After the third anomaly, at 660 hours, the availability is further degraded
to 1Zo8 percent and so on for the remainder of the anomalies. Anomaly 30
which has no specific time given is assumed to occur midway between
launch and the time of anomaly Z9; i.eo, at 6575 hours. The scale of the
curve in Exhibit 10 is such that it does not accurately portray each anomaly
occurrence (end point availability is less than one-half of one percent)
but it is generally indicative of the mathematical process described above.
Furthermore, in spite of all the assumptions made and expedients taken, the
curve is reasonably representative of actual spacecraft performance.
Spacecraft 15b was, in fact, turned off at 14,144 hours and no further
attempt has been made to extract useful information from it. This profile
of the availability history of Spacecraft 15b, while quite indicative of the
performance of this spacecraft is not easily related to the performance of
other spacecraft or to the performance of this spacecraft under the assump-
tion of Space Shuttle utilization. A single numeric which satisfies the
requirement of being easily comparable is the average availability. Aver-
age availability is determined by integrating the instantaneous availability
curve (Exhibit 10, for example) from zero to mission end and dividing by
the mission duration. This figure for Exhibit I0 is 0.035 or, expressed as
a percentage, the average availability for Spacecraft 15b is 3. 5 percent
under actual historical conditions.
The potential impact of the Space Shuttle on Spacecraft l 5b still
remains to be determined. For this purpose, the following general assump-
tions with respect to Shuttle utilization are made.
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I. The Space Shuttle can be fully utilized as described in the
previous subsection dealing with anomalies. Repair missions, however,
are undertaken only when the spacecraft accumulates a predetermined
percentage of repairable degradation as defined above. The percentages
selected for this analysis are 100, 80, 50, and 20. In terms of the
instantaneous availability curve, a Shuttle repair mission is undertaken
whenever availability falls below the value (I-D) where D is the repairable
degradation. This term (I-D) is referred to herein as the availability
threshold. Note that because of the defined relationship between degradation
and mission effect codes, a zero percent availability threshold is never
reached and, hence, no repair missions, subsequent to initial satellite
launch, are ever undertaken in this case. All repair is assumed to be
perfect, where possible.
Z. All repairable anomalies occurring at an indicated time
of e or at a specific time less than Z4 hours are repaired by the launching
Shuttle before leaving the vicinity of the spacecraft.
3. All repairable anomalies occurring before 170 hours
but after 24 hours are assumed to be repaired by the launching Shuttle if
the mission effect of the anomaly is Code Z or larger.
4. Any orbit repairable anomaly with mission effect greater
than Code 1 which occurs too late for repair by the launching Shuttle will
be repaired by another shuttle 170 hours from occurrence.
5. Any repairable spacecraft anomaly occurring within the
170 hours required for the orbit repair of another anomaly in that spacecraft
will also be repaired during the Shuttle mission scheduled to repair the
initial anomaly.
6. Any ground repairable anomaly is assumed to take the
spacecraft out of commission for 500 hours before resuming operation.
The times of occurrence of all subsequent anomalies for that spacecraft
are adjusted accordingly. The only exception is when the spacecraft
is recovered and returned to ground by the launching Shuttle, in which
case the times of the subsequent anomalies remain unchanged. Two
Shuttle missions are necessary for eachground repair incident; one to
return the spacecraft to ground and another to relaunch it.
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7. When the available data for a particular spacecraft ends
with an anomaly no repair mission is undertaken. The average availability
is unchanged by this assumption, but the number of repair missions
required is reduced somewhat: i.e. , if a final repair is made, an additional
r_pair mission is required to achieve the same average avaiIability.
8. Some spacecraft anomalies as recorded in the Data
Bank have no specific time associated with their occurrence. These
anomalies are assumed to be evenly distributed within the interval from
launch to last reported anomaly° When the number of anomalies with no
time of occurrence is greater than four for a given spacecraft, they are
aggregated into at most four groups for ease of handling. The combined
effect of the anomalies integrated into a group is treated as an individual
anomaly.
Exhibit lla repeats the plot of the actual performance of Spacecraft
15b (referred to as status quo) and adds a curve representing the
instantaneous availability over the same mission duration for the "launch
only" or 0 percent availability threshold case. Note that the first two
anomalies cause no degradation since they would have been prevented by
Shuttle utilization. The first degradation in this curve occurs at 660
hours and then basically tracks the status quo curve but at a higher avail-
ability level. Integrating under this curve and normalizing indicates an
average availability of 21o9 percent, a six-fold increase over the status quo,
case.
Exhibits llb, llc, and lld add curves to the status quo and launch
only cases which represent Shuttle utilization policies based on initiating
a repair mission at a 20 percent availability threshold, respectively. Each
increase in the instantaneous availability curve represents another Shuttle
repair mission. In Exhibit lib ShuttIe repair missions occur at approxi-
mately 3000 and ll000 hours. Thus, three Shuttle missions are required for
the case of a 20 percent spacecraft availability threshold: an initial mission
to launch the spacecraft and two repair missions. The following tabulation
summarizes the analysis of Spacecraft 15b.
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_o
Shuttle
Utilization
Policy
Status Quo
Launch Only
20% Availability
Threshold
50% Availability
Threshold
80 % Availability
Threshold
Application
Average Availability
(Percent)
No. of Missions
Required
3.5 1
21.9 I
68.0 3
76.8 4
90.0 10
Analyses entirely similar to that given above for Spacecraft 15b
were performed for I04 spacecraft in the Data Bank. These spacecraft
represent all those in the Data Bank from programs which l) had reasonably
long term earth orbital missions, 2) used unmanned spacecraft, and 3) had
reasonably complete historical data. The programs used in the analysis,
together with the number of spacecraft in each program, are listed in
Exhibit 12. Appendix B gives a detailed summary of the availability anal-
yses of these spacecraft.
In Appendix B, each spacecraft is listed by an index number,
together with the length of time that the spacecraft was under observation
as recorded in the Data Bank. If the spacecraft requires only a Shuttle
(no Tug) for launch or revisit its index number is annotated with an asterisk.
The average availability and required number of Shuttle System visits
(expendable launch vehicle for the status quo case) are tabulated for each
spacecraft. These numbers are derived as illustrated in the preceding
example. For the status quo case, A is defined to be the average avail-
ability and N the number of expendable launch vehicles. N is at most one
for each spacecraft but may assume fractional values of the form 1/n when
n spacecraft are carried into orbit by the same vehicle. The Vela space-
craft, for example, are launched in pairs; hence, these spacecraft are
each assigned one-half a launch vehicle.
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EXHIBIT 12 - SELECTED SAMPLE OF SPACE PROGRAMS
Program
Ariel Z
ATS 5
Courier 2
Early Bird l
Explorer 32 l
GEOS 2
Nimbus 5
OAO 3
OGO 6
OVI 12
OV2 2
OV3 6
OSO 8
RAE I
Relay I
Secor 14
Solrad 3
Syncom 3
Telstar g
Tiros 8
TOS 7
Vela 10
i04
No. of
Spacecraft
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The Shuttle Systems required are tabulated as N 1, which represents
the number of Shuttle System missions required in the "baseline" situation.
That is, each Shuttle System is assumed to launch the same number of
spacecraft as its expendable counterpart and each on-orbit repair
is assumed to require one Shuttle System mission. Ground repair
requires an additional mission. N 1 is given for the Shuttle launch-only
case {zero percent availability threshold) and for the availability thres-
holds of 20, 50, and 80 percent. Average spacecraft availability,
again denoted as A, is also given for each of the four thresholds.
The final entry for each spacecraft in the tabulation of Appendix B is
denoted N 2 and represents the number of Shuttle System missions required
when multiple mtssions are considered. Multiple missions are defined
herein as a single Shuttle System performing two {or more} of the baseline
missions. Multiple missions are assumed to occur whenever two (or more)
baseline missions have launch dates in the same one week period and the
ephemerides of the two (or more) spacecraft are compatible with the
altitude and plane change capabilities of the Shuttle and Tug as given in
Appendix A. Multiple missions are entered in separate rows of the
Appendix B tabulation and indicate that a Shuttle and Tug are nearly always
required for multiple missions even if the Shuttle alone is capable of per-
forming the baseline missions. By entering the multiple missions sepa-
rately, the value of N 2 for a particular spacecraft sometimes becomes
zero and simply indicates that the required baseline mission has been sub-
sumed in a multiple mission.
There are three classes of spacecraft missions included in Appendix
B. First, and most numerous (81 of the 104 missions), are successfully
launched spacecraft which experience one or more anomalies and operate
for their indicated lengthof time. The second class consists of those
spacecraft which were unsuccessfully launched (17 of the 104 missions).
Finally, there are six spacecraft which were successfully launched, but
which have no recorded anomalies in the Data Bank. The average availa-
bility of the last class is, of course, always I00 percent. For the unsuccess-
ful launches, average availability is zero for the status quo case and 100
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percent (for essentially zero time) for all Shuttle utilization cases. The
first class of spacecraft has an average availability depending on its
anomaly record and the Shuttle utilization case considered.
Exhibit 13 has been constructed to summarize the analyses reported
in Appendix B. Averages for all the parameters discussed above are
included for each of the three classes of spacecraft, for all successfully
launched spacecraft, and for all I04 spacecraft analyzed.
An even more abbreviated summary of this analysis is presented
in graphical form in Exhibit 14. The largest gain in average availability
is achieved by using the Space Shuttle as a launch vehicle. However,
average availabilities on the order of 95 percent can be obtained by
dedicating as few as two Shuttle system launches per spacecraft mission;
i.e., one launching Shuttle and one revisit, taking advantage of multiple
mission capabilities. Exhibit 15 gives the instantaneous availability
profile of an "average" spacecraft both for the status quo case and for the
various Shuttle utilizations.
The preceding analysis is conservative on at least two counts.
First, it only considers the increase in availability over the observed
length of the mission. It is clear, however, that a Shuttle assisted mission
could be much longer in most cases even without additional Shuttle flights.
For example, Spacecraft 15b is essentially "dead" at 14,000 hours in the
status quo situation, whereas at a 20 percent availability launch threshold
the availability at 14,000 hours is over 75 percent. The extended time to
degrade to zero from this point has not been considered in this analysis
at all. The second point of conservatism lies in the assumption that the
same anomalies occur at the same time in each situation. Shuttle repair
of an early anomaly might, however, exercise a favorable influence on
subsequent anomalies by lengthening their time to occurrence, preventing
them altogether, or more likely, changing their occurrence time, nature,
and specific effects. Repair of earlier anomalies should in no case accelerate
the occurrence rate of subsequent anomalies or increase their inherent
degradation potential.
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IV. SHUTTLE IMPACT ON FUTURE SPACE PROGRAMS
The potential impact of the Shuttle System on future spacecraft design,
development, and test programs is presented in this section in the form of
Statements of Impact (SOIs). The SOIs illustrate the potential effect of
the Shuttle in modifying existing program approaches and procedures to
achieve greater overall effectiveness at lower cost. The emphasis in
this presentation is on effectiveness rather than cost. Both factors,
however, are treated only in a qualitative sense.
The starting point for this effort was a survey of the design, develop-
ment, and test activities of previous space programs as documented in
the PRC/SSC Space Data Bank. Special attention was devoted to problems
encountered in the completion of these previous programs to determine
areas most susceptible to improvement through Shuttle utilization. Three
programs were studied in some detail to assure that all factors were
considered. The following two subsections discuss this survey of previous
space program experience and the generation of the Statements of Impact.
A. Spacecraft Design, Development, and Test Experience
Three programs, the Nimbus, the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory
(OGO), and the Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) were reviewed in
detail to gain insight into the historical problems encountered in the design,
development, and test activities of typical large unmanned spacecraft pro-
grams. Particular aspects of other unmanned spacecraft programs were
also studied. Typical of these were the antenna tests for the Radio
Astronomy Explorer, the development and test of various subsystems of the
Mariner series of spacecraft, and the shroud ejection tests of the Orbiting
Astronomical Observatory. The results of these investigations are reflected
in the rationale for each SOIas presented in subsection B, below.
In reviewing these programs, it was concluded that had they been
performed in the Shuttle era, on spacecraft of contemporary design, most
ground development and test efforts would have remained the same with
a few notable exceptions. The principal exceptions are those development
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and test activities which could be more effectively performed in an orbital
environment, particularIy those which are difficuIt, expensive, or impos-
sible to conduct within the constraints of the present ground facilities.
Examples are quaIification and acceptance tests in orbital environments
rather than in thermal-vacuum chambers, evaluation of advanced state-
of-the-art components under actual operational conditions, and electro-
magnetic propagation experiments. In most cases, tests at the integrated
spacecraft level are more advantageously replaced with on-orbit Shuttle
tests than are part, subassembly, and assembly level tests.
For spacecraft redesigned to take advantage of Shuttle capabilities,
further alterations could be made in current space program test require-
ments. The alleviation of payload weight and size constraints together
with Shuttle availability would result in high reliability through the use of
redundancy and lower part stresses. Better maintainability and repair-
ability through modularization would allow less sophisticated mechanical
and electronic designs to be used and would result in more commonality
with other spacecraft. These factors would, in turn, give a high degree
of confidence in component flight readiness with a significant reduction in
part and subassembly ground tests.
B. Statements of Impact
The studies described in subsection & above, together with the
Shuttle Capabilities Document (Appendix A), were used to formulate
a generalized flow diagram of the design, development, test, checkout,
and operations of a typical spacecraft using Shuttle System capabilities.
This flow diagram is presented in Exhibit 16. The first nine boxes,
through that labeled spacecraft launch, are representative of current
space programs. The five added boxes represent capabilities made
possible only with the utiIization of a Shuttle System. The nonrectangular
boxes (also designated by a Roman numeral) indicate those stages in the
overaI1 space program development which might be expedited by Space
Shuttle flights. The Statements of Impact (SOIs) presented below are
organized into eight categories corresponding to the eight Shut-tie assisted
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functions. The Shuttle impacts all activities in the program of course
and, although not shown in Exhibit 16, there are information feedback
loops which carry the products of Shuttle utilization to the appropriate
ground based design or planning function.
Of the eight Shuttle assisted functions, only I and II are not related
to a completed (or nearly completed) spacecraft. Function I implies the
use of the Shuttle to determine the value of physical phenomena as
measured from space, which are needed to design a long term, unmanned
satellite. If achievement of space program goals requires the develop-
1_ent of new technology devices, these can be proven in space prior to
their integration in an entire spacecraft through the Function II applica-
tions of the Space Shuttle. Function III is primarily envisioned as use of
the Space Shuttle to replace awkward space simulation tests such as the
commonly required thermal-vacuum tests. Major subsystems might
also be tested in this way. If an entire system is tested and found to be
successful, it may be started on its mission without returning it to the
ground.
Functions IV and V cover the nominal launch mission, including
spacecraft checkout, deployment, and initial repair as required. The
two blocks are connected with dashed lines to indicate that, although they
define separate functions, they are usually conducted together using the
same Shuttle mission. Boxes VI and VII cover the on-orbit repair and
retrieval functions capable with the Space Shuttle. Box VIII indicates
the addition of Tug capabilities to all other Shuttle functions if required.
The circled letters in ]Exhibit 16 are Shuttle classification codes
indicating anomalies which could have been prevented or repaired by using
the Shuttle for a particular function. These are used in conjunction with
the various Shuttle capabilities to generate and support the various
Statements of Impact. An example is the tabulation of Exhibit 17. Of
the 1190 anomalies occurring on successfully launched spacecraft, 320
were associated with malfunctions of major components. The other anom-
alies represent system, subsystem, interface, or other problems not
related to a specific major component. Two tabulations are shown in the
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exhibit, one classifies the major component anomalies by general
equipment type, and the other by specific components.
The following subsections contain expanded descriptions of Shuttle
hnpact Categories I through VIII. Supplementing the category descriptions
are (I) a list of components, subsystems, or tests which are potentially
impacted by the particular Shuttle function and (2) several Statements of
Shuttle Impact (SOIs) that together with the rationale and supporting data,
serve as vehicles for presenting specific ideas on the design, development,
and testing of Shuttle compatible spacecraft and potential changes in the
management of space programs.
I. Category I: Physical Phenomena - Observation and
Measurement
The Shuttle experiment packages carried on the planned sortie
missions will provide means for precisely measuring and evaluating the
physical characteristics of earth and space as seen from orbit. Data
from these missions will enhance the design of subsystems and experiments
such as :
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Star trackers
Solar arrays
Horizon scanners
Infrared, visible and ultraviolet photography
Photometry
Spectography
Radion_et ry
Antennas (patterns and propagation)
Electromagnetic and particle radiation
Laser communications (atmospheric propagation)
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SOl s I through 3 have been generated in this category. These are presented
and discussed in the following paragraphs.
a. SOI I: For some space program objectives, automated
spacecraft will be completely eliminated.
Many short duration space experiments can be conducted
within the time frame of a Shuttle sortie mission. Sufficient data can be
taken during this period so that a dedicated spacecraft launch might be
eliminated. For example, the biological experiments conducted in low
earth orbit during the Bio Sat program could have been conducted more
effectively on the Space Shuttle, where first hand examination of the specimens
would have been possible.
Other specific functions which could be performed on a Shuttle Sortie
mission, thereby eliminating the need for an automated spacecraft, include:
o Laser communications experiments
o Photographic missions for specific areas of interest
o Observations of solar eclipses and other transient phenomena
Spacecraft launches in the Data Bank that could have been replaced
by Space Shuttle sortie missions include some of the Orbiting Vehicle
series devoted primarily to short term data gathering functions and a
large proportion of the 93 Agena spacecraft.
b. SO1 Z: Spacecraft design problems will be eased and
anomalies prevented by utilizing Shuttle observationb
of astronomical phenomena.
Selected phenomena can be observed on the earth and
in space during Shuttle sortie missions. These data can then be utilized
in the analysis and development of new technology sensors. For example,
selected parameters of the ocean might be measured from the Shuttle
to assist in the development of oceanographic sensors to be placed on
automated spacecraft.
At least 25 anomalies in the Data Bank might have been prevented
had Shuttle observations of various astronomical and geophysical pheno-
mena been available. Most of these are related to horizon sensor designs
requiring earth infrared models or solar array degradation caused by the
several components of solar radiation.
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Co SO1 3: The sensitivity, resolution, and accuracy of
earth and astronomical observation sensors will be
verified.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to properly simu-
late the conditions under which such instruments as spectrometers,
photometers, and radion,z£ers will be gathering data. On previous pro-
grams, the tests failed to predict many of the problems encountered with
the quality of sensor outputs. Shuttle testing of these devices will not
only reveal problem areas but also provide information required for design
parameters. Designing for a wide input range, simply because no previous
direct observations have been made on the input characteristics, leads to
over-complexity and hence decreased reliability.
Attitude sensors alone accounted for 30 of the major component
anomalies (nearly 10 percent of the total) listed in Exhibit 17. The majority
of the anomalies associated with experiments, mission sensors, and
attitude control equipment types are also sensor problems. These equip-
ment types account for nearly one-third of all major component anomalies.
2° Category II: New Technology - Development and Test
Another use of the Shuttle sortie mission is to conduct tests
on advanced state-of-the-art experiments and subsystem designs that
are potentially affected by the space environment or which observe
and/or use physical phenomena that can only be accurately duplicated in
orbit. The advantage of the Shuttle test lies in verifying the performance
and realized potential of the equipment prior to integration into the space-
craft subsystem. Typical tests are to determine:
o Angular resolution and discrimination characteristics of
star trackers and horizon scanners
o Actual effects of solar heating on sensitive assemblies
(e.g., solar panels)
o Realized resolution of photographic experiments
o Assembly performance in thermal-vacuum conditions
o Sensitivity and accuracy of spectrometers, photometers,
radiometers and other designs
SOIs 4 through 7 have been generated in this category.
presented and discussed below.
These are
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a. SOI 4: The elapsed time from concept formulation
to final design of new technology components will be
significantly reduced.
Using the Shuttle system capabilities, new components
and sensors can be developed and subsequently tested prior to being
used operationally in an automated spacecraft, thereby reducing overall
development time. For example, the Shuttle would have been instru-
mental in the development of the horizon sensor. At least six anomalies
can be identified in the Data Bank which could have been prevented by
verifying the design on the Shuttle prior to use.
Other component anomalies of this type include (1) the failure of an
infrared interferometer spectrometer caused by the earth albedo entering
the optics housing and thereby raising the temperature of the unit to in-
tolerable levels, (2) the loss of a millimeter wave experiment for six
months while outgassing in the area of the multipactor was completed,
and (3) an inoperable filter wedge spectrometer caused by an ice deposit
on the cooled detector.
Without the Shuttle, each of these anomalies and approximately
six others required feedback from orbital operation to perfect their
design. With the Shuttle this time lag could be eliminated and many
of the usual ground test procedures could also be eliminated or at least
considerably streamlined.
b. SOI 5: Routine Shuttle testing of spacecraft components
prior to spacecraft integration is not warranted for
components within the state-of-the-art.
Only a small fraction of the anomalies in the Data
Bank could have been prevented by component testing on the Space
Shuttle, and most of these involved experimental components. For
components that are within the state-of-the-art, the record indicates
that shuttle testing is unnecessary in terms of both the anomaly occur-
rence frequency and the mission effect.
The Data Bank contains data on 4000 to 5000 major components,
the vast majority of them being well within the state-of-the-art.
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Only 16 anomalies, however, were judged to be preventable by
component testing on the Space Shuttle. Of these 16 anomalies, 13 were
associated with experimental components. Only 2 of the anomalies had
a mission effect greater than Code 2 (both on developmental horizon
sensors) and only 3 of the anomalies occurred after May 1966.
c. SOI 6: Antennas will be realistically tested and actual
antenna radiation patterns will be obtained by orbital
evaluations instead of simulations.
Antenna radiation patterns, both satellite-to-satellite
and satellite-to-ground, can be determined without the interference or
reflections that occur even in the purest ground-based anechoic chambers.
Also, _round-based atmospheric and ionospheric simulations cannot
accurately duplicate the normal spacecraft operational conditions.
Though no serious antenna performance problems have been en-
countered in the past, a number of minor problems directly and indirectly
related to antenna propagation and interference might have been avoided
had new antenna deployment and positioning schemes been evaluated on a
Shuttle sortie mission.
d. SOI 7: New approaches to spacecraft stabilization or
new applications of existing types of stabilization
mechanisms to uniquely configured spacecraft will be
evaluated under orbital conditions.
Such stabilization devices as gravity gradient systems,
magnetic torquers, and nutation dampers can be satisfactorily tested
only in orbit. The need for such testing is obvious if the devices utilize
a new design. It is also needed if an existing stabilization device is
incorporated into a new spacecraft, since each satellite has a unique
mass distribution which creates unique problems. Due to the physical
nature of the forces involved and the difficulty of suspending a satellite
without friction, accurate simulation of orbital conditions is impossible.
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Unpredictable precessions, wobbles, and other instabilities have been
observed on previous programs. Thus, an effective approach would
be to evaluate stabilization system operation in conjunction with other
orbital performance and environmental tests.
Several programs incorporating new designs and approaches for
attitude stabilization have experienced serious failures. At least three
spacecraft in the Data Bank suffered a 33 to 67 percent mission loss
due to poor attitude control as a result of oscillations in the veristat
booms and disruption of the gravity gradient system by aerodynamic
drag and solar pressure effects.
3. Category III: Orbital Environmental Tests
The Shuttle provides an opportunity to conduct qualification
and acceptance tests on integrated prototype spacecraft in a fully de-
ployed mode under true operating conditions. A spacecraft, upon suc-
cessfully completing this test, can then serve as the first operating
model in the flight program. Failed spacecraft would be returned to
earth for failure evaluation and hardware or procedure redesign. This
type of test would be particularly effective on complex, high-cost pro-
grams. It would partially or entirely replace the following simulations
and environmental tests.
o Thermal-vacuum chamber test -- especially solar
simulations, liquid N z heat sink simulations, and air-
bearing attitude control and stabilization tests.
o Separation system tests
o Solar array and boom deployment tests
o Anechoic chamber tests
o Pyrotechnic demonstration tests
o Integrated system EMI tests
SOIs 8 through 1Z are presented and discussed below:
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a. SOI 8: Thermal-vacuum testing of spacecraft will be
eliminated or replaced by testing on a Shuttle sortie
mission.
Thermal-vacuum testing on the ground of large spacecraft
or spacecraft with complex deployable members requires extensive equip-
ment and complicated procedures. Even then, an adequate simulation of
the actual space environment is rarely achieved. Both of these diffi-
culties are readily overcome by testing the integrated spacecraft on a
Shuttle sortie mission.
The following items, chosen from the Data Bank, are indicative of
the residual problems associated with current thermal-vacuum testing:
o There are many spacecraft with extremely long appendages
(booms or antennas) for which existing thermal-vacuum facilities
are generally inadequate to conduct an integrated spacecraft
test in the fully deployed mode. Therefore, all aspects of
the spacecraft design cannot be evaluated even under simulated
conditions o
o On one such spacecraft a boom deployment failure occurred
due to cable insulation stiffened by low orbital temperatures.
The ground testing of this deployment was inadequate because
of unrealistic simulations imposed by the size limitations of
readily available thermal-vacuum chambers.
o At least four programs in the Data Bank have suffered mission
degradation averaging nearly 50 percent due to thermal design
deficiencies remaining after the conduct of thermal-vacuum
tests.
b. SOl 9: Attitude control and stabilization subsystem
designs will be verified during orbital qualification
tests on a Shuttle sortie mission.
Comprehensive tests of the attitude control and stabiliza-
tion (ACS) subsystems on various spacecraft programs have proved to be
very difficult since an accurate simulation of the conditions of space is
not possible. Most of these tests are conducted in conjunction with thermal-
vacuum chamber tests on the prototype-model spacecraft.
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Thermal-vacuum tests of ACS subsystems can be improved by orbital
qualification tests in at least the following areas:
o Providing real targets for star, solar, and horizon sensors.
Simulated targets for star and solar sensors and particularly
for horizon sensors are rarely satisfactory and often result
in erroneous sensor inputs. A number of operational and
test failures have occurred because of this problem.
o Maintaining a vacuum environment. With thrusters operating,
true vacuum conditions cannot be maintained in a thermal-
vacuum chamber (37 anomalies - 25 percent of those on the
ACS were related to thruster operation).
o Providing actual spacecraft mass effects. Thermal-vacuum
chamber size constraints usually do not permit complete
boom deployment and therefore bending moments, true mass,
and moments of inertia are not adequately simulated. This
is especially true of spacecraft with long booms such as those
of the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory spacecraft.
o Investigating solar radiation pressure and aerodynamic force
effects on the stability and attitude control of low perigee
orbit spacecraft. This can only be done in space. Three
anomalies of this type were found in the Data Bank resulting in
33 to 67 percent mission loss.
o Eliminating the need for air bearing suspension systems.
These systems are essential for ground tests, are difficult
to set up, and tend to introduce errors. In one program the
position and rate tracking system used with the air bearing
suspension system was too complex to implement and was
never successfully exercised.
c. SOl I0: Component interactions and interface characteristics
that cannot be determin_ testin_ocedures
_luated in an _lificatlon test.
A number of operational problems have arisen in past
programs due to the impossibility of accurately simulating all operational
and environmental conditions. Typical areas where simulation is difficult,
if not impossible, include artificial horizons, dynamic booster/spacecraft
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interface, zero-g deployments, pyrotechnic actuations, etc. Also, it
is difficult to duplicate all operating modes for a realistic test of a complex
control system, such as one utilizing an on-board computer. The most
effective means to reduce the problems stemming from such unpredictable
factors is orbital qualification of a totally integrated system.
The Data Bank indicates that approximately 25 percent of the problems
in space vehicles were reIated to the lack of relevant system tests.
One experiment failed due to overheating when an outgassing shroud
caused changes in the properties of the spacecraft thermal coating.
OAO-B failed to achieve orbit when a dynamically untested latch
failed and prevented nose fairing jettison.
Reference 4, a study of 88 launches in 3 launch vehicle programs,
indicates that 25 flight failures were encountered. Of those, "three were
attributed to personnel error and the remaining 22 were the result of an
anomalous operation of a deficient or defective component that, once it
had been assembIed in or attached to the completed vehicle, allowed for
no testing technique that would provide for malfunction detection. "
Reference 4 concludes:
"Thus, the most frequent real cause of flight failure is the
malfunctioning, inoperability, or structural separation of a
piece of basically mechanical hardware that does not lend
itself reasonably, or, in most cases at all, to systems
testing. "
d. SOI 11: On programs involving severai identical
spacecraft, orbital testing will be a very effective and
economical means of clualifying the subsystems.
Integrated qualification tests in the launch and orbital
environment would exercise the spacecraft subsystems and their interfaces
under conditions that are difficult to simulate on the ground. On programs
involving several spacecraft, this would be economical in that individual
sybsystems testing would be reduced. Also design deficiencies could be
discovered before equipment fabrication or subsequent missions had
progressed far enough to make rework costly.
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e. SOI 12: Testin_ for overstress conditions will be
difficult on a Shuttle sortie mission.
In general, testing for overstress conditions will have
to be carried out at ground facilities since development tests utilizing the
Shuttle are limited to the normal, orbital environmental exposures. Some
exceptions to this might be:
o Overstress launch acoustic conditions could be created by a
shuttle launch with reduced acoustic insulation in the payload bay.
o Low temperature overstress could be simulated by operating
the test spacecraft in the shadow of the Shuttle.
4. Category IV: Shuttle Payload Launch Capability
The capability of the Shuttle to launch much larger and heavier
payloads than are common in the Data Bank with relatively milder environmental
stresses has many design and cost implications.
Five areas of spacecraft design in which the Shuttle would have the
greatest impact are listed below. The pre-Shuttle implementation in
most of these areas was not possible due to the relatively limited payload
capability of the expendable boosters then available. For each of these
design areas, a number of potential benefits are listed which might be
expected from full Shuttle utilization.
1) Subsystem and Component Standardization and Modulari-
zation
o Greatly reduced design verification and environmental
testing
o Higher reliability
o Lower cost per spacecraft
o Spacecr aft-to-s pacecraft inter changeability
o Cluster satellite concepts possible
o Ease of maintenance and repair
o Fewer wearout problems
o Fewer integrated system tests
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Z) More Subsystem and Component Redundancy
o Reduced reliability testing
o Lower parts burn-in requirements
o Lower component reliability requirements
o Improved reliability
o Fewer Shuttle repair missions required
3) Overdesi_n and Increased Safety Factors
o Wider parameter margins
o Lower parts burn-in requirements
o Reduced subsystem reliability testing
o Increased component reliability
o Better experiment isolation
o Better EMI control
o Better thermal control
o More effective radiation shielding possible
4) Built-in Test Capability
o Less prelaunch testing required
o Less Shuttle test equipment required
o Fewer telemetry channels used for diagnosis
o Easier on-orbit repair
5) Increased Spacecraft Performance
o Larger propellant capability for orbit modification
o Larger nuclear power supplies
o Larger stationkeeping potential
o Larger and more effective radio telescopes
o Added capabilities for interplanetary missions
The largest number of SOIs for any of the eight categories occur here.
There are 12 Statements of Impact, numbered 13 through 24. These are
presented and discussed below:
a. SOl 13: The physical spacecraft envelope will be less
restricted, thereby allowing more conservative techniques
to be applied at the lower design levels to reduce the
possibility of failures.
Shuttle launched spacecraft can be designed with packaging
techniques that are far less dominated by volume and weight considerations.
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This should
0
result in:
More conservative circuit assembly methods utilizing more
effective potting and more rigid mounting. This should, in
turn, lead to a reduction in corona problems, vibration
induced failures, and internal shorts and opens.
o The use of more conservative part stresses through the
use of physically larger components.
o The use of heavier heat sinks for more effective component
cooling and better reliability.
b. SOI 14: Much more redundancy will be possible,
thereby significantly enhancing reliability.
In the past, weight restrictions have often been the
deciding factor in whether redundancy should be incorporated. With the
increased capacity of the Shuttle, redundancy based on reliability considera-
tions alone can be provided in both mechanical and electronic subsystems.
c. SOI 15: More effective techniques for suppression and
control of electromagnetic interference will be available,
thus reducing design and test efforts and yielding per-
formance benefits.
In the Shuttle programs, weight and envelope tradeoffs
against the control of EMI need no longer be seriously considered. The
ample payload and volume capacity of the Shuttle allows increased use of:
o Shielded cables in areas of possible interference
o Shielding cans around transformers, relays, motors and
other EMI producers
o Heavier shielding in critical areas where light shielding is
now employed
o Specialized packaging for improved electromagnetic com-
patibility of components that are highly sensitive to inter-
ference
o Designs which are not EM/ sensitive
o Large ground busses
PRC R- 1467
q2
Seventy-six anon, alies in the Data Bank are directly attributed to
EMI/RFI causes. EMI was a source of performance degradation for
60 of the 304 spacecraft in the entire Data Bank.
d. SOI 16: Locations for sensitive experiments will be
optimized for isolation and maximum data gathering
capability.
Magnetic and electromagnetic interference and com-
patibility problems have occurred in nearly all complex spacecraft such
as those from the Nimbus, Orbiting Geophysical Observatory (OGO), and
Mariner progran_s.
With the increased size, weight, and deployment capabilities of
the Shuttle, each sensitive or noisy experiment can be positively shielded
and n_ounted separately on a boom sufficiently long for proper isolation.
Where questionable, the degree of shielding and boon_ length required
can be determined by Shuttle test.
Typical of on-orbit problems is the fact that on one spacecraft the
full capability of a very sensitive search coil magnetometer could not be
realized because of magnetic interference. This interference occurred
due to the proximity of n_agnetic sources. Among these sources were
magnetized components, radiated fields in current carrying wires, and
malfunctions in experiments.
To automatically deploy many isolated experiments is quite ex-
pensive, especially in terms of reliability. Also it is very difficult to
conduct a realistic and adequate test of a spacecraft on the ground in the
properly deployed configuration. Extensive OGO tests at the quiet
magnetic facility near Malibu, California, were unable to prevent later
orbital problems, evidenced by the fact that on all OGO's it has been
necessary to alternately cycle some experiments to reduce as much as
possible their interference with one another.
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e. SOI 17: Spacecraft performance will be greatly en-
hanced due to improvements that can be achieved in
the rmal control.
In the past, thermal control limitations have placed
restrictions on the designs of other subsystems and poor thermal char-
acteristics have caused operational failures. With the Shuttle launch
capability, a wider, more flexible selection of thermal control designs
and techniques will be available. The use of more and larger radiators
and coolant systems, elaborate control mechanisms such as shutters,
and increased insulation will allow much more precise thermal control
of the primary spacecraft subsystems as well as isolating them so that
they are more independent of each other.
The Data Bank reveals that nine percent of the successfully launched
spacecraft have experienced anomalies correctable by better thermal
control. Thirteen percent of these spacecraft experienced a mission
degradation in excess of thirty-three percent.
One spacecraft, for example, lost all data storage capability due
to thermal problems after 720 hours of operation and another suffered
severe degradation due to a final amplifier overheating which caused the
telemetry transmitter to fail.
f. SOI 18: Nuclear power systems will become feasible_
resulting in larger power capacity and longer missions.
Several problems which currently dominate the nuclear
power supply field will be alleviated by the Shuttle. The launch capacity
will allow the use of heavy shielding and the boost vehicle reliability will
assure safe injection. If desired, the power supply can be deployed a
large distance away from the spacecraft to avoid any nuclear effects on
the subsystems.
This is especially significant for interplanetary missions, since
the ultimate success of such exploration depends largely on the develop-
ment of reliable power sources other than solar/battery systems. For
less far-ranging missions, the increase in available power will allow
less sophisticated and therefore lower-cost, more reliable designs.
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For example, larger safety factors and design margins can be employed,
more redundancy can be incorporated, and better thermal control can be
achieved.
g. SOI 19: Extensive self-check and built-in test capa-
bilities will be incorporated in spacecraft designs.
With the easing of weight and size constraints, more
of the payload can be devoted to spacecraft self-check and built-in test
capability. This can be accomplished through the use of an on-board
computer which would also be able to automatically sense failing con-
ditions and switch to redundant circuits.
This system should reduce the number of telemetry and data
handling circuits required which, in the past, were responsible for 34
percent of all satellite anomalies. It should, in turn, reduce ground
station requirements, and faci]itate circuit trouble-shooting and "work-
around" solutions to the problems not automatically solved on-board.
h. SOI 20: Vulnerability to nuclear radiation will be
more easily reduced to tolerable levels.
With only limited weight and envelope constraints,
nuclear hardening and shielding is more easily effected. For example,
specially hardened components can be selected without considering their
weight and volume impact; more and heavier shielding, commensurate
with the equipment sensitivity and vulnerability can be employed.
i. SOl 21: Use of standardized subsystems will greatly
reduce spacecraft testing requirements and increase
s.pacec raft reliability.
The standardization of spacecraft subsystems as pro-
posed by the Lockheed Low Cost Payload Study (Reference 5) will sub-
stantially reduce the subsystem and component environmental tests,
design verification tests, and integrated functional verification tests,
which currently occupy a large proportion of an overall spacecraft de-
velopn_ent program.
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Standardized subsystems also promise to yield substantial benefits
by avoiding spacecraft anomalies attributed to all kinds of design de-
ficiencies. The Data Bank attributes 65 percent of all anomalies with an
assignable cause to design deficiencies (Reference 1, page 45). Since
80 percent of these anomalies occurred in subsystems which could be
standardized, it follows that fully 50 percent of all anomalies could even-
tually be avoided by correcting design deficiencies in early models of
standardized subsystems. This goal could be approached more rapidly
through wider use of the standardized subsystems.
j. SOI 22: Spacecraft structural dynamic simulation and
testing will be virtually eliminated.
The support structure for a Shuttle-launched spacecraft
may be designed with a wider margin of safety in bending moments,
rigidity, etc., due to the relaxation of weight constraints made possible
by utilizing the Shuttle System. These increased safety factors will
allow the spacecraft to easily withstand acceleration, vibration, and
acoustic forces far larger than those that will be experienced in the
relatively mild launch environment of the Shuttle or Tug. Optimizing
the designs with structural dynamic simulations and tests will therefore
not be required.
k. SOI 23: Full scale simulator-type testing to launch
environments will be replaced by lower-level testing
to the Shuttle environment, thus eliminating the need
for large simulators.
Launch phase simulators are constructed to provide
full scale, combined environmental testing for the launch environments
of acceleration, acoustic loading, three degree-of-freedom vibration,
and vacuum. In the Shuttle era, the following three factors will result
in elimination or reduction of these simulator testing requirements.
o It will not be practical or necessary to build the very large
simulators needed to contain and test the large spacecraft
of this period. Should a launch induced failure occur,
spacecraft retrieval would be more practical.
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o For sInall spacecraft, limited launch phase simulator
tests will still be necessary, since it wouId probably be
cheaper to run limited tests than to retrieve a failed space-
craft for a rerun. The tests would provide assurance that
no launch-induced failure would cause loss of the spacecraft
prior to the environmental tests or loss of a spacecraft
launch on a regular mission without environmental tests.
o The generally milder Shuttle environments will allow
a significant reduction in simulator testing require-
ments, particuIarly in the areas of acceleration
and vibration (lower overall levels combined with
better adapters).
In applicable cases, consistent with the three factors above, launch
phase simulator tests can be replaced by the actual Shuttle launch environ-
ment experienced by the spacecraft during placement for orbital environ-
ments or qualification testing.
1. SOI Z4: Large scale acoustic tests on full size
spacecraft models will be eliminated.
Current programs require acoustic environmental tests
to experimentally determine the magnitude and spectra of the spacecraft
vibrational response. Extensive tests were conducted on the Orbiting
Geophysical Observatory (©GO) program to determine the acoustic
response of the spacecraft and to verify shroud transmission loss charac-
teristics. On OGO, these tests were conducted using the thermal struc-
tures wind tunnel at Langiey Research Center.
With the Shuttle system, the acoustic tests can be eliminated for
the following reasons:
o The acoustic environment produced by the Shuttle launch
vehicle with most proposed configurations will be milder
than the acoustic environment produced by standard launch
vehicles.
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o The spacecraft structure can be produced with minimal
acoustic sensitivity due to the reduced launch weight
constraints provided by the Shuttle.
o The Shuttle Orbiter payload bay can be acoustically isolated,
if necessary for a particular spacecraft, with a relatively
small weight penalty.
5. Category V: Initial On-Orbit Checkout, Deployment and
Repair
The spacecraft designs possible with the large payload capa-
bilities of the Shuttle, together with its ability to accompany a spacecraft
for a period of time after orbital insertion, allow a complete post-launch
checkout prior to release with solitary orbit. Any anomaly resulting from
the launch and release environments would be repaired on-orbit or, if
this is not feasible, the spacecraft can be returned to earth for refur-
bishment. Manual assistance in deployment of experiments, long booms,
solar paddles, etc., is also possible in this mode.
Some impacts on present spacecraft designs, tests, and procedures
by this Shuttle utilization are:
o Reduced deployment mechanism tests
o Increased deployment reliability
o Better experiment EMI control (using very long booms)
o Better ACS performance (using more rigid booms)
o Larger radio telescope possible
o Reduced subsystem testing
o Reduced part burn-in requirements
o Solution for very prevalent early failures
SOIs 25 through 28 for this category are presented and discussed
below.
a. SOl 25: Separation subsystem design and testing
programs will be greatly simplified.
Standardized Shuttle adapter mounts for docking and
retrieval will obviate the need for the development tests usually required
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for each type of spacecraft. In one program, for example, a special
separation mock-up was fabricated to evaluate the dynamic separation
of the spacecraft from the adapter and to verify proper shroud clearance.
Actually, two series of tests, several years apart, were necessary to
complete this evaluation.
OAO-B is only one of a number of spacecraft that failed to achieve
orbit due to failure to jettison the nose cone. This failure occurred in
spite of an extensive test program to assure that the separation subsystem
would function properly. The entire background surrounding this par-
ticular anomaly which tends to support this S©I is contained in: Final
Report of Investigations Conducted By the OAO-B Launch Vehicle Review
Board, Lewis Research Center, NASA, 8 June 1971.
b. SOI 26" Design and test efforts associated with com-
plicated, automatic deployment mechanisms will be
greatly reduced and more dependable deployment
methods will be achieved.
Many low orbit spacecraft have long booms for experi-
ments, gravity gradient systems, and antennas. In addition, nearly
every spacecraft program requires some deployable elements such as
solar arrays, sensor platforr_is, etc. The Shuttle makes it possible to
either l) accomplish the complete, required deployment manually, 2)
perform some portion of the deployment sequence manually, or 3)
provide a standby service to manually assist in automatic deployments
if needed. For low orbit spacecraft, this would eliminate the necessity
for redundant and complicated automatic deployment mechanisms which
are subject to failure, and would reduce the necessity for such mech-
anisms on spacecraft in high energy orbits. In addition, it would greatly
reduce the design and test burden associated with these devices.
There are six anomalies in the Data Bank associated with deploy-
able structures. The most severe of these resulted in serious mission
degradation when experiment booms did not completely deploy precluding
attitude control and stabilization and a concomittant loss of power.
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c. SOI Z7: Extensive component burn-in programs can
be reduced to minimal levels.
Severalaspects of the Shuttle program on spacecraft
reliability combine to reduce the need for extensive component burn-in
programs. The liberalized launch weight and size constraints willallow
specified reliability to be achieved more effectively by redundancy.
Also, the use of the Shuttle for on-orbit repair, refurbishment, or
retrieval willcontribute to the operational reliability. Such factors as
these imply that more cost-effective designs can be achieved by the use
of standard parts that undergo the more economical lot burn-in procedures.
d. SOI 28: More sophisticated and reliable radio-telescope
arrays will be possible due to the elimination of present
deployment test and construction problems.
A number of current problems limit the expansion of
orbiting radio astronomy observatories. Some of these problems are:
o Large boom-arrays must be deployed with automatic
mechanisms that have a relatively high failure rate.
o Actual operating conditions, i.e., weightlessness and
vacuum, cannot be simulated in ground testing.
o Systems with tubular, extendable elements must be tested
for straightness to assure a tip deflection within the speci-
fied limits. This is a formidable task for very long (up to
1000 feet} arrays.
o Thermal gradients from solar radiation can cause long, light-
weight booms to bend.
o Critical portions of the system, such as the dispenser mech-
anism, cannot be made redundant.
With the availability of the Shuttle, these problems can be overcome
and larger, more sophisticated radio-telescope arrays can be deployed
in space. Specifically, the Shuttle can serve in the development and im-
plementation of such systems in the following ways:
o It can test concepts of automatic and manual deployment on
sortie missions.
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o It can verify accepted deployment schemes, the straightness
of extended elements, etc.
o It can carry larger (and redundant if necessary) dispenser
mechanisms to deploy tubular, extendable elements of a
larger diameter and heavier material. This would reduce
tip deflection and alieviate the thermal gradient problem on
increasingly longer booms.
o It can repair a system that has not deployed properly or
utilize a manual, backup mode to accomplish deployment.
o It can retrieve a system for rework if deployment cannot be
accomplished or if boom straightness or tip deflection are
not within the specified range.
o It opens the way to design approaches not previously con-
sidered.
6. Category VI: Revisit Flight for Maintenance and Repair
In the event of spacecraft damage, wearout, or failure, the
Shuttle is capable of returning for on-orbit repair. This capability would
extend spacecraft design life by replacement of worn-out components
and replenishment of depleted propellants in addition to the impacts re-
lated in Category V.
SOIs 29 through 32 for this category are presented and discussed
in the following paragraphs.
a. SOI 29: Spacecraft design will be modularized.
Most of the standard subsystems and major components
will be modularized and removable without requiring calibration, for
ease of replacement on-orbit. Priority will be given to modularizing
failure-prone subsystems and components.
Ninety-two percent of the major nonpreventable anomalies (436 of
475) are repairable utilizing Shuttle system capabilities. Of these 436
anomalies, modularization wouId expedite repair in over half of the
cases.
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If the priority for modularization is based on failure susceptibility,
the Data Bank indicates the following should receive early consideration:
Subsystems
Telemetry and
data handling
Payload subsystems
Timing and command
Components
Tape recorders
Batteries
Experiments
Attitude sensors
T ransmitte rs
TV cameras
Component Category
Electronics
Energy sources
Experiments
Mission sensors
Attitude control
Exhibit 17 and Reference 1 provide a more detailed and quantitative
assessment of the relative frequency of component and subsystem
an omalie s.
b. SO1 30: Significant cost benefits will accrue from
repair or retrieval of spacecraft that incur early
failures.
The Shuttle enables on-orbit escort of a spacecraft
for as long as seven days after the initial deployment. Since a significant
number of anomalies have occurred during this initial period in the past,
the ability to effect repairs from the Shuttle, especially by modular
remove-and-replace techniques, will assure a greater chance of success-
ful, long-term, spacecraft operation. Irrepairable spacecraft will be
retrieved for earth refurbishment if it appears to be cost effective.
Of the 57 unmanned spacecraft under the management of GSFC in
the 1960 to 1970 timeframe (Reference 6), 58 percent of the failures
experienced during the first month of flight occurred on the first day and
76 percent occurred in the first week. The 45 first-day failures involved
30 of the spacecraft. Only ZZ spacecraft survived the first day without
any type of malfunction. Seven percent of the first-day malfunctions
were catastrophic (greater than 90 percent loss) to the mission and 5Z
percent were catastrophic to the component involved.
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The sample of 104 spacecraft selected for availability analysis in
Section III. B included 17 unsuccessful launches and 40 other spacecraft
that incurred significant anon_alies within the first week of launch.
Using cost estimates provided by The Aerospace Corporation, the total
first-article cost of the unsuccessfully launched spacecraft is approxi-
mately $150 million. Multiplying the first-article cost of each of the
other 40 spacecraft by its first week mission degradation and summing
the products indicates a loss of another $176 million. For the selected
sa1_ple, this amounts to a potential savings of over $3 million per space-
craft launch, due solely to the repair and retrieval capability of the
Space Shuttle as applied to ano_alies occurring in the first week.
c. SOI 31: The Shuttle capability of replacing spacecraft
battery modules will prolong the life of many space-
craft and prevent mission degradation on others due
to battery wearout.
If spacecraft battery modules, which preferably would
contain the charge and discharge control circuitry, were easily replac-
able on-orbit, many failures would be prevented. Battery failure usually
has a significant to catastrophic impact on system operation, which is
especially important in view of the fact that batteries have a low shelf
and cycle life, and relatively low reliability. Also, failures in solar
arrays, charge control, and command and control assemblies, which
create life-degrading over/under charge conditions, frequently cause a
secondary failure of a battery. In addition to reliability risks such as
these, the data bank indicates n_any more problems would have occurred
due to battery degradation and wearout had the spacecraft not failed for
other reasons. This in, plies that the availability of Shuttle maintenance
and repair will cause battery problems to become increasingly significant.
Fifteen percent of the spacecraft in the Data Bank (47 of 304)
experienced battery anomalies. Thirteen percent of all battery anomalies
caused the total loss of the spacecraft. Four percent permitted sunlight
operation only using the solar panels. Twenty-one percent of the anoma-
lies caused a mission degradation of 33 to 67 percent. The remainder
caused an average degradation of 21 percent.
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d. SOI 32.: Spacecraft expendables can be replenished
on a routine basis.
Many programs could have been extended had the Shuttle
been available to replenish depleted propellant. Mission degradation
could have been prevented in other cases when restricted operating modes
became necessary to conserve a prematurely dwindling propellant supply.
Also, with the Shuttle replenishment capability, fuel cells, which have
had limited application due to their voracious appetite for fuels, might
see wider use. In addition to being attractive for systems requiring
large quantities of electrical power, the cryogenic hydrogen-oxygen
could be used as a propellant and the water by-products could be used
as an evaporative cooling agent.
The Data Bank indicates that 33 anomalies of ACS subsystems were
related to or caused by the excessive loss of propellants and pressurizing
expendibles. The average mission degradation for these anomalies was
21 percent. Three of the anomalies caused an 80 percent average loss
in spacec raft capability.
7. Category VII: Spacecraft Retrieval and Return to Earth
Even more fundamental than the Shuttle capability for space-
craft on-orbit repair is the capability for retrieval of spacecraft or
portions thereof and returning them to earth.
Impacts in this area include:
o Refurbishment of orbit-unrepairable spacecraft
o Analysis of long-term space environment effects on
materials and assemblies
o Retrieval of photographs and other permanent records
o Retrieval of defunct spacecraft for analysis
SOIs 33 and 34 for this category are presented and discussed
below.
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a. SOI 33: Orbital failure mechanisms and reactions due
to the space environment will be studied by'retrieval
of long-term spacecraft after their mission is com-
pleted.
Retrieval on a space-available basis of spacecraft
which have orbited over an extended period and which are no longer being
used can yield important data in such areas as:
1) Micrometeorite erosion of lenses, mirrors,
solar cell glass cover plates, etc.
2) Solar radiation degradation of thermal reflective
surfaces, solar cells, sun sensors, etc.
The recovery of Surveyor components by the Apollo crew yielded
valuable data on the space environmental effects on hardware and on
solar and cosmic phenomenon.
Anomalies resulting from material and component degradations
due to particulate and electromagnetic effects might have been prevented
had recovery of some early failure samples for study been possible.
Programs suffering from this type of anomaly include GEOS, Nimbus,
OGO, OSCAR, OSO, OV1, Pioneer, Relay, Transit, and Telstar. The
average degradation for the anomalies occurring on these spacecraft
was about 3Z percent.
b. SOI 34: Materials will be placed in orbit for prolonged
periods and then retrieved to determine their reaction
to the space environment.
Several failures and performance deficiencies on past
programs have been attributed to hhe failure of materials to perform as
predicted in the space environment. Typical problems have involved
changes in the reflectivity of thermal coatings, degradation of solar cell
output, micrometeorite erosion of lenses, vacuum welding, evaporation
of bearing lubricants, etc. Such space-induced failures can be reduced
by orbiting test vehicles carrying a wide assortment of new materials
that have possible spacecraft applications. These experimental assort-
ments could be designed to simulate their anticipated application and,
in cases where a catastrophic failure is possible (for instance, bearing
lubrication), they could be monitored to establish their MTTF.
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8. Category VIII: High Orbit Boost and Retrieval
With the Tug, Shuttle capabilities are extended to high orbit
and deep space.
Impacts of the Tug on future space programs are very similar to
those of the Shuttle in Categories IV, V, VI, and VII as applied to space-
craft with orbits beyond Shuttle capabilities.
SOIs 35, 36, and 37 for this category are presented and discussed
below.
a. SOI 35: High altitude spacecraft will be iniected into
designated orbits with high reliability.
The Tug, a well designed and tested boost vehicle,
standardized for all high altitude injection missions, will be at least as
reliable as currently used boost vehicles for high orbit injection and
positioning and will have the added advantage of transferring to high
orbit only those spacecraft checked out at a low orbit and found to be
space worthy.
b. SOI 36: High-orbit spacecraft will be repositioned.
Spacecraft in circular orbits above the Shuttle zone
and those in highly elliptical orbits can be repositioned or restabilized
by the Space Tug. This could be required as a result of a failure in the
spacecraft propellant system, or as part of the design in cases such as
synchronous, communications satellites that must be periodically re-
stationed.
In the Data Bank sample of 104 spacecraft, two were found to be
amenable to restoration of 100 percent capability by stabilization and
reorientation using the Space Tug.
In the ATS F &G Program, the satellite is required to be re-
positioned from over the Americas to over India to implement one
experiment. This requires a large payload penalty in propellant and
several months in transit time. Restationing tasks such as this could
be more effectively executed by the Tug.
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c. SOI 37: High orbit spacecraft will be returned for
repair and refurbishment in the event of failure.
Spacecraft in circular orbits above the Shuttle zone
and those in highly elliptical orbits can be returned to usefullife
through repair by the Shuttle or ground refurbishment using the Space
Tug for orbital transportation.
The Data Bank indicates that 220 anomalies could be repaired
onlywith the availability of the Space Tug. Fifteen of these failures
(7 percent) were catastrophic and 6 (3 percent) were very serious (67 to
95 percent loss). The remaining 199 resulted in an average mission
loss of 20 percent.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, the reliability history of the U.S. space program
has been examined in detail while considering the question: "What if
the Space Shuttle had been operational in the 1958-1970 time period? "
In answering this question it was assumed that Shuttle capabilities
were as defined in late 1971 and that all spacecraft considered were
Shuttle-compatible with respect to repair and retrieval. These assump-
tions are completely defined in Appendix A of this report. Recent modi-
fications to these assumptions are not reflected in Appendix A, since
they do not influence the results of this study in any significant way.
The reliability history of the U.S. space program in the 1958-1970 time
period was assumed to be adequately reflected in the PRC/SSC Space
Data Bank, which is discussed in Section II.
The study was treated in two parts. The first part, covered in
Section III, analyzed the potential effect of the Shuttle on the anoma-
listic behavior of orbital spacecraft. The second part, covered in
Section IV, investigated the influence of Shuttle capabilities on future
unmanned spacecraft design, development, and test programs. In both
parts, only the technical influence of Shuttle utilization was considered;
cost tradeoffs were not within the scope of this study.
From Section III it may be concluded that the Space Shuttle would
be highly effective in correcting or preventing spacecraft anomalies of
the type occurring in the 1958-1970 time period. Nearly three-fourths
of all observed anomalies would be favorably affected by Space Shuttle
utilization. An even higher proportion of early or severe anomalies
would be amenable to Shuttle utilization.
The average availability (proportion of nominal spacecraft capa-
bility that is realized) is increased 50 percent by simply replacing the
expendable boosters with Space Shuttle launches and providing initial
on-orbit checkout and repair capability. Average spacecraft avail-
ability can be increased to nearly 95 percent by dedicating, on the
average, one Shuttle repair mission per year.
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As discussed in Section IV, the impact of the Space Shuttle on
future programs will be extremely far-reaching and favorable. Removal
of constraints imposed by expendable boosters on spacecraft volume and
weight appears to be the largest single contributing factor. This factor
has major implications for the spacecraft design, permitting as it does
the use of:
o Larger safety margins
o Increased redundancy
o Standardized modules
o Standardized subsystems
These design changes, in turn, permit a much reduced testing program.
Standardization in particular, once implemented, should rapidly obviate
the need for all but the most routine checkout of standard modules
because early feedback from space operation could be used to remedy
inherent design or procedural deficiencies.
Testing state-of-the-art components or entire spacecraft in the
actual space environment by means of the Space Shuttle would also
eliminate or reduce the extent of many of the awkward and unsatisfactory
ground tests and simulations currently required.
The repair and retrieval capability of the Space Shuttle exercises
its principal influence by maintaining operable spacecraft on-orbit, but
also tends to reduce testing requirements, simplify designs, and shorten
the development period of individual space programs.
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APPENDIX A SHUTTLE CAPABILITIES
I. SCOPE
The intention of this summary is to provide the general require-
ments and capabilities of the Shuttle Orbiter (Earth to Orbit Shuttle
(EOS)) and the Space Tug (Orbit to Orbit Shuttle (OOS)) to be utilized as
a baseline for the PRC/SSC study, PRC D-1813, "Use of the Space
Shuttle to Avoid Spacecraft Anomalies," dated Z4 November 1971, as
defined in the Study Plan. These capabilities are presented in terms
of Shuttle and Tug performance for payload orbit injection, maneuvering
and retrieval.
The approach to the design and configuration concepts of space-
craft built to be compatible with the proposed Shuttle Systems are also
described. The data for this summary are principally derived or in-
ferred from the references listed.
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II. SHUTTLE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES
The general baseline configuration assumed for this study is the
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corporation (MDAC) two-stage fully reusable
launch vehicle with a high cross range (HCR) delta wing orbiter similar
to the configuration used in the analyses of the Aerospace Corporation
(References I-5).
The Shuttle Booster is an LOz/LH 2 powered unit of 30 x 106
Newtons (6.6 x 106 ) Ibs. ) of sea level thrust with turbofan jet engines
for flyback and go-around capabilities.
The Shuttle Orbiter is a double delta wing configuration powered
with rocket engines to supply the ascent thrust to orbit and with an op-
tional turbofan Air Breathing Entry System (ABES) weighing 9,230 kg
(20,300 ibs. ) employed for powered landing and go-around capability.
The ABESis used when the Shuttle Orbiter is configured for transport-
ing passengers to and from orbit and should otherwise be assumed to
be removed. Orbiter entry heat protection is provided by reusable
metallic heat shields using titanium, nickel, cobalt, and columbiurn
materials, with carbon-carbon for leading edges.
The Space Tug, as a reusable single stage, functions in conjunc-
tion with the orbiter to extend its payload-altitude capability. It is
designed to furnish spacecraft ascent, retrieval, and positioning capa-
bility above that obtainable with the Shuttle Orbiter.
A. Configuration
The configuration of principle interest to this study is the mech-
anical, structural and crew interfaces with the payload.
1. Shuttle Mechanical/Structural Configuration
The mechanical/structural interface includes the payload
bay structure, payload deployment/retrieval mechanisms, and payload
support structure. The orbiter structure in the vicinity of the payload
bay is shown in Figure 1. The payload is contained within the structure.
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There is no separate container/compartment that defines the payload bay.
A preliminary design of the B/[DAC baseline payload deployment and dock-
ing mechanism is shown in Figure 2. The payload is stowed as shown
and deployed 90 degrees out of the cargo bay for subsequent payload re-
lease, recapture, and/or docking to orbiting space stations or other
Shuttle orbiters. The flexible tunnel shown allows transfer of personnel
from the orbiter to the payload in either the stowed or deployed positions
without interrupting the tunnel pressure seal.
The payload release and docking mechanism is shown in Figure 3.
This system consists of a square docking frame supported on eight ex-
tendable shock attenuators. The attenuators/actuators are extended and
retracted, by redundant nitrogen sources. They are capable of retracting
payloads (after docking capture) to engage structural latches for subse-
quent pressurized crew/cargo transfer and payload stowage in the cargo
bay for payload return to earth.
The crew is carried in the forward compartment in a shirt sleeve
environment. From 6 to 12 passengers can be contained in a special
shirt sleeve environment module carried in the payload bay.
2. Shuttle Payload Bay
The nominal Shuttle payload bay is sized to accommodate a
payload with envelope dimensions 4.57 m (15 feet) in diameter and 18.29m
(60 feet) in length for a minimum clear volume of 283 m 3 (10,000 ft3).
The clear volume is defined as that space envelope required to accom-
modate the above-mentioned payload envelope, allowing for payload and
Shuttle deflection and movement for any combination of temperature and
load conditions during any flight, pre-flight, or post-flight phase of op-
era#ion. Additional space is provided for the payload support/attachment
structure and the deployment/retrieval mechanisms and for nominal clear-
ance of the payload envelope within the orbiter structure. 28VDC and all
phase 400 Hz AC power is supplied from the standardized junction boxes.
Standardized fluid interfaces are provided for propellants and for cryo-
genic and pressurized gasses.
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3. Payload Configuration Constraints
Payloads will be equal to or less than 4.57 m (15 feet) in
diameter and 18.29m {60 feet) in length including handling rings, at-
tachment fittings for the deployment mechanism and docking, cargo
bay storage fittings and spares. The standardized deployment mecha-
nism(s) and tie points are charged to the orbiter and shall not occupy
the clear volume. Deployment clearance will be provided by the orbiter.
Limited transfer of cargo, however, is possible through the personnel
transfer hatch which is 0.76 meters (30 inches) in diameter. In general,
payloads are loaded prior to moving the orbiter to the launch pad but
will be accessible on the pad. Payload elements containing hazardous
material have self-contained protective devices or provisions against
all hazards. Provision for purging, conditioning, and venting the pay-
load bay for all mission phases are provided in the vehicle design.
Payload weight constraints can be determined by calculations
from data in the following sections.
4. Shuttle Manned Experiments
NASA has tentatively defined two possible manned _ sortie"
missions which are briefly defined. The first category includes the
manned experiment modules, and the second category includes the pallet
type modules which are generally unmanned (with the exception of the
orbiter astronauts and technicians). The manned experiment modules con-
sist of a spherical shaped crew quarters, that always remains in the Shuttle,
and a pressurized cylindrical shaped experiment compartment that can
be rotated 90 degrees to enable its extension into free space from the
Shuttle cargo compartment. Figure 4 presents a typical manned experi-
ment module configuration. The same basic module can be utilized to
house different experiments, and thus reduce the number of basic mod-
ules that must be provided to conduct the planned sortie mission model.
The average sortie mission will carry four to six principal researchers
into orbit for about five days. The planned operation of these manned
experiment module sorties will be similar to the Convair 990 program
now being conducted at Ames Research Center.
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The pallet type modules consist of an air lock and experiment
support structure° The experiment support structure can be rotated
90 degrees to facilitate equipment viewing or thermal requirements in
space. The air lock will be used to house mission-unique monitoring
equipment and may require ingress/egress capability into the cargo
bay by a suited astronaut. The missions will generally be from 2 to 5
days in duration. The pallet-type module is much simpler than the
manned experiment module (which utilizes a pressurized container to
house most of the man-operated experiments), and will therefore be
developed first in the evolution of the sortie modules. Other experi-
ment packages and concepts are described in more detail in Section 5
of the LMSC Report (Reference 6).
5. Space Tug Mechanical/Structural Configuration
The most likely Tug configuration to be selected is the re-
usable single-stage unmanned concept. This will be used as a baseline.
It is 4.57m in diameter and 10.67 m in length (15 x 35 feet), fueled with
LHz/LO 2 and weighing approximately 31750 kg (70,000/lbs) fueled and
3175 kg {7,000 lbs) empty. It is designed to fit snugly in the orbiter
payload bay with volume left for spares, test equipments, etc. It is
reusable for ten flights before reconditioning is necessary and can re-
main quiescent in orbit for 180 days. The standardized docking mech-
anism in the Tug is assumed to be similar to that proposed by LMSC
for the SEO (Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter) spacecraft as shown in
Figures 5 and 6. This system would likely function with four passive
reflectors mounted on the ring face to supply transponding to rendezvous
and alignment sensors through transmitters on the Tug. The maneuvers
1
would be coordinated from the Shuttle Orbiter or earth stations.
B. Shuttle Performance
The data in this section are presented in two parts. The data for
the Orbiter capabilities are first, followed by data for the Tug capabilities.
1See Section 8.3, Reference 6, for more detail.
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1. Shuttle Orbiter General Performance
The STS 1 will have the availability of four Booster Stages,
two at the Eastern Test Range (ETR) and two at the Western Test
Range (WTR). Five Orbiters will be available, three at ETR and two
at WTR. The turn-around time for landing to launch readiness will be
less than 2 weeks with a launch rate varying between 25 and 75 per year.
The Shuttle has an all-azimuth launch capability. Figures 7 and 8 show
the azimuths available from each test range.
The system is designed with nominal safety factors (1.4) to place
29,480 kg (65,000 lbs) of payload into a 28.5-degree inclination low orbit
design mission and to return 18,150 kg (40,000 lbs).
The basic system shall be capable of seven days of self-sustaining
lifetime from liftoff to landing. Orbiter systems shall be qualified for
30 days of on-orbit operation, with the mass of expendables above the
7-day requirement charged against the payload. The orbiter Attitude
Control System (ACS) is accurate to + 1° with a stabilization rate of
0.3 ° per sec.
2. Shuttle Orbiter Maneuvering Capability
The orbiter is initially injected into an insertion orbit of
93 x 185 km (50 x 100 n. mi. ) and then thrust into the desired orbit with
the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS). There are three reference
mission orbits which serve here to bracket the nominal capabilities of
the shuttle.
Inclination
28.5 °
55 °
90 °
Circular Altitude
185 x 500 Km
(100x270 n. mi.)
185 x 500 Km
185 x 500 Km
P aylo ad
79,480 kg (65,000 lbs)
23,590 kg (52,000 ibs)
12,700 kg {28,000 ibs}
1Space Transportation System.
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FIGURE 8 - CURRENT VEHICLE LAUNCH AZIMUTHS--WTR
(Refcrence 5, Page 4-36)
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The values here and those in the following figures are based on
(1) a High Cross Range (HCR) orbiter configuration that has a reentry
glide range of 2,040 km (I,100 n. mi.), (2) retention of an abort capa-
bility, (3) removal of the ABES (with the ABESused, subtract 9,230 kg
from the allowable payload weight), and (4) fuel allowances allocated
for rendezvous and docking maneuvers and for other contingencies.
Under these conditions the Orbiter has the nominal _V capability at
orbit injection of 460 m/sec (1,500 ft/sec). It is planned that the OMS
propellant tanks may be sized to provide a total /_V as large as 610
m/sec (2,000 ft/sec) which yields the maximum payload-altitude
cap ability.
The nominal gross and maximum gross payload capabilities for
any launch inclination are provided in Figure 9. The nominal rather
than the maximum impulses should be used in calculations unless other-
wise stated. Figure 10 provides similar Orbiter gross payload capa-
bilities as a function of inclination and circular orbit altitudes without
ABES. Any payload/orbit/i nclination combination of which the Shuttle
Orbiter is capable can be extrapolated from these figures. For pur-
poses of this study, 900 km (485 n. mi.) is considered the maximum
altitude for the Shuttle Orbiter. In order to utilize these figures properly,
net payload weights must be converted to gross payloads weights to
account for adapters, handling and mounting fixtures, and spares.
Figure 11 provides an estimate, as a function of net Shuttle payload
weight, of the payload adapter weight, spares weight (assumed to be
0.7 times the net payload weight), and the combination of these to pro-
vide the gross payload weight. With spares, the gross weight is approxi-
mately twice the net weight. Elliptical orbits must be converted to cir-
cular energy equivalents. Figure 12 provides those conversions for low
earth-Shuttle orbits. For calculations of higher orbits see Figures 13,
14, and 15 in the section on Tug performance.
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Pro blem:
1
Consider a 100 x400 n. mi. elliptical
orbit for a net payload of 15,000 lbs
launched at a 90-degree inclination
with spares. Is this within the shuttle
o rbite r capability?
So lution : From Figure 11 the gross payload with
spares is found to be 29,000 lbs(13,150
kg). The elliptical orbit is converted
with Figure 12 to a 300-n. mi. (555 kin)
equivalent-energy circular orbit. From
Figure 10 it can be seen that in a 300
no rni. (555 krn) circular orbit at an in-
clination of 90 degrees, the shuttle is
capable of a gross payload of 25,000 lbs
(]1,340 kg) which is below the calculated
gross. The mission must therefore be
conducted with the Tug or more likely be
considered without carrying most of the
spares, since the spares cannot be used
with the Tug anyway. Figure 11 reveals
that approximately 6,000 lbs (2,722 kg)
of spares can be carried in the Shuttle
mode.
:3. Space Tug (OOS} Performance and Orbit Maneuvering
C ap a bilit3r
If mission requirements exceed Shuttle-only capabilities,
or if the mission destination lies outside the shuttle operating regime,
then a shuttle upper stage would be required to complete the mission.
In this case, the net Shuttle payload would consist of a "package" that
would include the user's payload (spacecraft or cargo), a spacecraft/
upper stage adapter, a shuttle upper stage, and whatever payload ser-
vice equipment that might be required. As delineated in Figure 11,
the gross shuttle payload would be the sum of the net Shuttle payload
weight and the shuttle adapter weight {spares are not considered for
the Tug).
For Shuttle/Shuttle upper stage missions {both earth orbit and
earth escape), it has been assumed that the Shuttle Orbiter would be
1
Uo S. units facilitate use of the figures which were not converted to
international units for this report.
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injected into a 93 x 185 km (50 x 100 n. mi. ) elliptical orbit (reference
injection orbit); that the Orbiter would then transfer to an appropriate
parking orbit; and, finally, that the Shuttle upper stage would deliver
the user's payload from the parking orbit to the final orbit or space
destination. All maneuvers would be coplanar if the final orbit inclina-
tion is greater than 28.5 degrees. Otherwise, the Shuttle parking orbit
inclination would be 28.5 degrees and the required plane change would
be accomplished by means of the shuttle upper stage. The single stage
Tug (as differentiated from the expendable solid or liquid upper stage,
the ©OS-nuclear stage, the tandem reusable/expendable upper stages,
etc.) considered here has a geosynchronous equatorial orbit capability
as follows:
Payload delivery only, 3,720 kg (8,200 lbs)
Payload retrieval only, 1,315 kg (2,900 lbs)
Payload delivery and retrieval, 9.0 kg (2,000 lbs)
Payload delivery {expending stage), 9,030 kg (19,900 lbs)
For orbits other than geosynchronous, the payload capabilities of the
Tug can be calculated using the data in Figures 13 through 16.
Figure 13 depicts the velocity required for earth orbits. The
circular orbit characteristic velocities (V C) assume a Hohrnanntrans-
fer from the reference 185 km (100 n. mi.) initial parking orbit. The
curves for circular and eccentric orbits in Figure 13 are not related to
any particular launch site. However, the curve for circular equatorial
orbits from ETR shows the characteristic velocity requirements to
establish a circular orbit with zero-degree inclination after launching
due east from ETR. The calculation is based on the plane change being
optimally divided between the two impulses of a Hohmann transfer.
Synchronous altitude is indicated on this curve.
More general earth orbital data are contained in Figure 14, where
the total characteristic velocity (V C) requirements for orbits of arbi-
trary perigee and apogee are shown. The velocity contours of Figure 14
are based on the assumption of a transfer orbit with perigee at 185 km
(100 n. mi.) and apogee as shown along the abscissa, followed by a second
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PERFORMANCE (Reference 7, page IV-C-17)
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impulse to raise perigee or, if sufficiently large, to establish a new
apogee with the apogee of the transfer orbit becoming the perigee of
the final orbit. The more efficient maneuver involves establishing
the transfer orbit with apogee being the final apogee value, while using
the second impulse to establish a new perigee, rather than transferring
first to the new perigee and then raising the apogee. The difference
between the two techniques is significant only for very high-energy
orbits. The coast time in the initial transfer orbit may be limited by
system considerations. The coast time from 185 km (100 n. rni.) to
any transfer apogee may be estimated from Figure 13.
The total characteristic velocity shown in Figure 14 includes the
velocity impulse required at the apogee of the initial transfer orbit.
V C in these figures is the arithmetic sum of all velocity increments
required to perform a given mission. When V C of an orbit has been
determined from Figures 13 and i4, Figure 15 can be used to establish
the payload capabilities of the single-stage Tug for the delivery, re-
trieval, or the delivery and retrieval modes. Figure 16 provides the
means for calculating payloads for the expendable upper stages. The
expendable upper stage has been considered as an interim propulsion
vehicle used in the Tug flight regime until the single-stage reusable
Tug is developed. These stages should not be considered unless they
are the only means of achieving the required payload/orbit capability
(e. g., maximum performance Centaur).
An example of calculations for verifying the adequate capacity of
a single-stage Tug vehicle is shown below:
Problem: Retrieve a 6,000 lb spacecraft from a
100 x 10,000 n. mi. elliptical orbit
without a coplanar orbit change.
Solution: For the special case of 100 n. mi. (185
kin) perigee, Figure 13 yields a V C of
32,200 ft/sec (9,755 m/sec). From
Figure 15 this V C is within the single-
stage Shuttle retrieval capability for a
6,000 lb (2,720 kg) payload.
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Pro blem:
Solution:
Deliver a 5,000 Ibpayload to a 4,000
n. mi. x 50,000 n. mi. elliptical orbit
with the Tug.
From Figure 14 the altitude of initial
transfer becomes the perigee of 4,000
n. mi. (7,410 kin). On the ordinate the
50,000 n. mi. (92,650 kin) final apsis re-
quires a 39,000 ft/sec (11,890 m/sec)
characteristic velocity. Figure 15 re-
veals that this is within the nominal
delivery capabilities of the single- stage
Tug.
Pro blem : Deliver a 10,000 lb spacecraft to syn-
chronous equatorial orbit by means of
a shuttle upper-stage launch from ETR.
Solution: From Figure 13 the required characteristic
mission velocity (Vc) is 39,600 fttsec
(12,070 m/sec). From Figure 15 the re-
quired velocity exceeds the capability of
the single-stage Tug for the required pay-
load. From Figure 16, the required
characteristic velocity could be provided
at the required payload using the shuttle in
the maximum performance mode in conjunc-
tion with the Centaur upper stage. The
coplanar change required for this maneuver
is accounted for in Figure 13.
The use of the figures in these examples is restricted to an initial
Earth orbit of 185 km (100 n. mi.) with no plane change required after
the launch ascent. If these restrictions are violated, the general method
of calculating earth orbital transfers should be as specified in Section II
of Reference 7.
C. Reliability
For purposes of this study the STS can be considered a very re-
liable system. The probabilities of success estimated for the various
system components over the life of the program are as follows:
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Do
Component Failure Extent Reliability
STS ( Boo ster & Orbiter) Catastrophic .9999
STS Intact Abort .995
Expendable Booster 1 Catastrophic .97 (Avg)
Space Tug (Reusable) Catastrophic .99
Space Tug Intact Abort .99
P aylo ad Envi r onment s
p aylo ads.
The STS is expected to provide very mild environments for the
2
The data available at this time are general.
1. Vibration
The latest data, which place the Shuttle launch/ascent and
reentry loads at 3g maximum, provide a potentially softer payload ride
on the Shuttle than on the new low-cost expendable launch vehicles.
However, payloads mounted flexibly on the Shuttle structure or suspended
c antileve r- style from a suppo rt platform (like the paylo ad s hi st. ric ally
mounted atop a booster vehicle) will probably be exposed to load-ampli-
fications which will approach those experienced with the expendable
launch vehicles. The maximum value experienced should be less than
0.02 g2/I-Iz from 50 to 2,000 Hz.
2. Acoustic
Maximum acoustic levels are 159 db overall sound pressure
level (OASPL).
3. Acceleration
Maximum acceleration is 3g for the launch ascent, translation
and reentry regimes.
is."
a Shock
The payload experiences maximum shock on landing, whi c h
1
May be used early in the program as an interim booster.
2Reference 4 Section 4, and Reference 6.
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1.5g for 200 ms
1.Z5g for 150 ms
1.0g for 100 ms
0.75g for 50 ms
4. Pressure
descent is:
The rate of pressure change on the payload for ascent and
Ascent 1.013 x 105 N/M 2 (14.7 psi) to 0 in 120 sec
Descent 0 to 1.013 x 105 N/M 2 in 1600 sec
5. Temperature
The temperatures of the orbiter vehicle internal structure
and surfaces in the vicinity of the payload will remain within the follow-
ing ranges:
Maximum Minimum
Prelaunch 322°K (+IZ0°F) 200°K (-100°F)
Launch & Ascent 390°K (+150°F) 200°K
On-Orbit 390°K 200°K
(doors closed)
Entry 390°K 200°K
Post Landing 390°K 200°K
During on-orbit operation with the payload bay doors open, the payload
thermal environment is dependent upon the payload thermal control pro-
visions and the orientation of the payload bay opening with respect to
the sun.
PRC R-1467
A-35
III. SHUTTLE- COMPATIBLE SPACECRAFT CONCEPTS
The logical consequences of a low-cost, high-capacity STS is that
it allows modularized spacecraft of increased weight and volume to be
constructed at a reduced cost with improved reliability, maintainability,
and repair aspects.
A. Spacecraft Design
The following is a summary of the low-cost payload design philo-
sophy proposed by LMSC for spacecraft compatible with the STS and
utilizing its distinct advantages. These design guidelines will, for
purposes of this study, be assumed to be the approach used to engineer
the spacecraft which will be operational in the Shuttle flight period from
1979 to 1990. Greater details of these concepts may be obtained from
Sections Z and 5 of Reference 6 or from Reference 8.
I. Design Guidelines
The following are the assumed general guidelines that pay-
load system designers will implement in the design of low-cost payload
systems compatible with the STS.
a. System Design Guidelines
o Standardize unmanned payload subsystems
o Standard experiment interfaces
o Utilize minimum quantity of multi-mission
standard spacecraft
o Standardize unmanned payload checkout equip-
ment--for ground and in-orbit usage
o Select a simple spacecraft configuration, taking
full advantage of the payload weight and volume
capability of the Space Shuttle.
o Select the simplest systems that will meet
specification requirements to reduce design,
analysis, fabrication, and testing efforts.
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b,
C.
o Establish reliability goals based on the in-orbit
checkout capability of the Space Shuttle
o Limit equipment redundancies and backup
operating modes to those actually required by
reliability goals
o Avoid state-of-the-art developments that are not
proven in hardware usage
o Minimize command and data requirements
Subsystem Design Guidelines
o Select a simple spacecraft configuration that
requires only a simple structure
o Provide volume for low-density equipment in-
stallations to simplify installation design and to
ensure complete accessibility of equipment
o Use high factors of safety (three or greater) for
sizing structural elements to reduce design and
analysis efforts and to reduce or eliminate
static load testing
o Do not use beryllium, composite materials, or
other high-cost materials
o Eliminate deployment mechanisms whenever the
launch vehicle payload envelope permits fixed
installation of solar panels, antennas, sensors
and other equipment
o Avoid sophistication and miniaturization of
mechanisms
Experiment Subsystems
o Select simple experiment package configurations,
taking full advantage of the greater payload
capability
o When experiment thermal control requirements
differ significantly from other spacecraft sub-
system requirements, isolate the experiment to
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simplify thermal control of both the experiment
and the spacecraft
o Design for in-orbit maintenance of experiment
installation by modularization of equipment
o Design low-density experiment installations
with provisions for additions or changes to
experiment equipment
o Avoid mechanisms that are not self-supporting
in Ig
o Design low-density electronic packages to reduce
design, development, and manufacturing costs
o Eliminate in-flight adjustments
o Avoid miniaturization for weight and volume
reduction
Stabilization and Control Subsystems
o Do not overspecify component performance
requirements
o Limit back-up operating modes and equipment
redundancies to those specificalIy required by
r eliability goals
o Simplify equipment design by taking full advantage
of the greater weight and volume capabiIity
afforded
o Tradeoff the use of a generai-purpose computer
for stabilization, control and data processing
functions against alternate mechanizations
o Increase the volume of electronic equipment
(xZ or more) to reduce packaging density, thus
reducing design, manufacturing, and inspection
costs
o Reduce stress on parts and/or use larger, higher-
rated parts, in circuit design, thereby increasing
confidence in performance, and reducing testing
costs
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o Minimize command and data requirements
o Design for in-orbit maintenance by modularization
e. Communication, Data Processing, and Instrumentation
(CDPI) Subsystems
o Use the guidelines recommended for the Stabili-
zation and Control Subsystems
o Standardize CDPI equipment for spacecraft
commonality
f. Electrical Power Subsystem
o Standardize battery size for commonality
o Design to facilitate battery replacement in orbit
o Standardize and use low-density packaging techniques
for the regulation and control of electrical power
o Relax weight and volume constraints on solar
arrays for simpler design, lower stress factors,
and less costly solar cells
g. Attitude Control Subsystem
o Relax weight and volume constraints to achieve
simplicity commensurate with high-reliability
and long life
h. Environmental Control Subsystems
o Reduce complexity by isolating the areas requiring
special thermal control and through the increased
use of insulation
B. Spacecraft Checkout and Test
A phased spacecraft checkout approach was developed by LMSC for
the STS, so that a series of verifications using the same checkout tests
1
could be performed on a payload. There are seven phases associated
with this checkout test plan.
IFor more detail see Reference 6, sections Z and 8.
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exhibit, one classifies the major component anomalies by general
equipment type, and the other by specific components.
The following subsections contain expanded descriptions of Shuttle
Impact Categories I through vln. Supplementing the category descriptions
are (1) a list of components, subsystems, or tests which are potentially
impacted by the particular Shuttle function and (2) several Statements of
Shuttle Impact (SOls) that together with the rationale and supporting data,
serve as vehicles for presenting specific ideas on the design, development,
and testing of Shuttle compatible spacecraft and potential changes in the
management of space programs.
1. Category I: Physical Phenomena - Observation and
Measurement
The Shuttle experiment packages carried on the planned sortie
missions will provide means for precisely measuring and evaluating the
physical characteristics of earth and space as seen from orbit. Data
from these missions will enhance the design of subsystems and experiments
such as :
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Star trackers
Solar arrays
Horizon scanners
Infrared, visible and ultraviolet photography
Photometry
Spectography
Radiometry
Antennas (patterns and propagation)
Electromagnetic and particle radiation
Laser communications (atmospheric propagation)
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On a synchronous equatorial orbit payload (e. g. , SEO) 1, it is not
practical to perform repair only when a random catastrophic failure
occurs. Rather a payload replacement will be performed and the failed
SEOwill be returned to Earth for refurbishment. The statistical proba-
bility of occurrence of random failures on the SEO has been assumed to
average a Z-year time period.
Z. Refurbishment of Payloads {with the OAO and SEO used
as examples.)
a. OAO Refurbishment in Orbit
It is planned to periodically (at the end of each l-year
operating period, or as varied by actual failure experience) launch a
Shuttle with a set of replacement modules. The OAO would be retrieved
by the Shuttle in low earth orbit and all modules replaced while the OAO
is tethered to the Shuttle on the extended deployment/retrieval gear or
within the Shuttle cargo bay. The new modules would be installed in
the OAO by: (I) the Shuttle crew members working in EVA or non-
pressurized IVA; (Z) telefactor robots remotely controlled from the
Shuttle crew compartment; (3) automated devices; or (4) combinations
of these. Figure 17 shows four possible modes.
The Shuttle will return the failed or spent modules to earth for
refurbishment.
b. SEO Refurbishment
It is planned to periodically (at the end of each Z-year
operating period, or as varied by actual failure experience) launch a
replacement SEO with a Shuttle/Tug. The failed or spent SEO would be
returned to Earth for refurbishment. The low-cost SEOwillaccommo-
date refurbishment on orbit but because the Tug must be returned to
earth for propellant refill in the mode assumed, the SEO is returned to
1
SEO (Synchronous Equatorial Orbiter) Wt 494 kg (1,090 lbs)
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earth for refurbishment. For this operation, a ready-to-launch re-
placement SEO must be available on the ground at all times.
The first, second, and third of a set of four SEO's must be refur-
bished and ready for relaunch within 60 days (to match the average launch
cycle time of 60 days between launches). Refurbishment of the SEOwill
comprise replacement of the equipment modules and re-checkout of each
SEO. Because of the longer time-span required for module-level refur-
bishment, two sets of modules should be held in standby; this allows ap-
proximately four months for turnaround time for refurbishment of a set
of modules.
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SPACECRAFT AVERAGE AVAILABILITY ANALYSIS
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